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Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute:
Amicus Curiae Memorandum of
International Law Scholars and
Practitioners in Trajano v. Marcos
By DAVID COLE,*
JULES LOBEL,**
and HAROLD HONGJU KOH***
I. INTRODUCTION
Trajano, et at, Petitioners-Appellants v. Marcos, et at, Defendants-
Appellees is a consolidated appeal of five separate civil suits in the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.' Its resolution may well
affect the future of international human rights litigation in domestic
courts, in part because the Justice Department has chosen to use the case
to urge an extremely restrictive interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute,
an important jurisdictional basis for human rights suits in federal courts.
Plaintiffs in the consolidated appeals, all aliens, claim that they or
their relatives were arbitrarily detained, unlawfully imprisoned, tortured,
and/or summarily executed by defendants or persons acting pursuant to
defendant's authority. The defendants, also all aliens, include the de-
posed President of the Philippines, Ferdinand E. Marcos; General
Fabian Ver, a cousin of Mr. Marcos and former Chief of Staff of the
Philippine Armed Forces; and Imee Marcos-Manotoc, President Marcos'
daughter and National Chairman of the Kabataag Baranggay. 2 Plaintiffs
assert that defendant's actions violate customary international human
rights law, as well as United States and Philippine law. They seek both
punitive and compensatory damages.
* Staff Attorney, Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, N.Y.
** Associate Professor, University of Pittsburgh Law School; Cooperating Attorney,
Center for Constitutional Rights, New York, N.Y.
*** Associate Professor of Law, Yale Law School.
1. Trajano Compl. I 5-7, ER A2-A3; Sison Compl. I 6-7, ER A3; Hilco Compl. 1 10-
11, ER A5; Clemente CompL. 3, ER 16.
2. Id.
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Plaintiffs predicate jurisdiction upon the Alien Tort Statute.3 That
statute grants the federal district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil
action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States."4 Defendants were served with
process in the United States. The district court dismissed the cases on
act of state grounds.5
A. Issues Presented
After oral argument, the panel in Trajano v. Marcos requested the
Justice Department to address three issues as amicus curiae. These issues
were:
1. Does the Alien Tort Statute provide a cause of action for wrongful
death, wrongful arrest or torture committed by a foreign govern-
mental official against a foreign national in a foreign nation?
2. Does the act of state doctrine remove wrongful death, wrongful
arrest or torture from the federal courts' jurisdiction or is the doc-
trine inapplicable as a matter of law because those actions can
never be "acts of state" or because the "balance of relevant consid-
erations" favors a hearing?
3. Is the possibility of potential embarrassment to the United States
sufficient reason for the federal courts to abstain from hearing
these cases?
In response to these questions, the Justice Department submitted a
forty page brief devoted principally to arguing that the Alien Tort Stat-
ute should not apply to all torts committed in violation of international
law between aliens outside the territory of the United States, but only to
those violations that contravene international laws that create rights that
are recognized under United States law. This introduction briefly out-
lines the Justice Department's main arguments. The remainder of the
Article reproduces the amicus curiae memorandum submitted on behalf
of nineteen international law scholars and practitioners in response to the
Justice Department's brief.6 Eight years earlier, three of those scholars
and practitioners had signed the amicus curiae memorandum for the
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
4. Id.
5. Trajano v Marcos, No. 86-207, slip. op. (D. Haw. July 18, 1986), appeal docketed, No,
86-2448 (9th Cir. Aug. 20, 1986).
6. This brief was drafted by David Cole, Center for Contitutional Rights, Professor
Jules Lobel, University of Pittsburgh Law School, and Professor Harold Hongju Koh, Yale
Law School. It was submitted on behalf of Professors Anthony D'Amato, Lori F. Damrosch,
Drew S. Days, III, Richard Falk, Michael Glennon, Claudio Grossman, Joan Hartman, Har-
old Koh, Mr. William T. Lake, Professors Cynthia Lichtenstein, .Richard Lillich, Jules Lobel,
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United States submitted to the United States Court -of Appeals for the
Second Circuit in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.7 The Second Circuit's opinion
in Filartiga cited extensively to the Department's memorandum. Their
amicus brief now submitted by the scholars and practitioners in Trajano
maintained that the Justice Department's position in Trajano constituted
a reversal of its position in Filartiga, and was contrary to an established
body of judicial precedent as well as basic principles of international law.
B. Justice Department's Amicus Brief
The Justice Department devoted virtually its entire brief to the
Ninth Circuit's first question, concerning the scope of the Alien Tort
Statute. The Justice Department argued that United States district
courts do not have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1350 over a suit be-
tween aliens for torts that were committed in another country, except in
extremely circumscribed situations.' It maintained that the Alien Tort
Statute confers jurisdiction on the courts of the United States only if
there is some nexus between the international law ("Laws of Nations")
allegedly violated and the United States responsibility under domestic
law. In its view, Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction should be limited to
those situations where the tortfeasor was subject to United States juris-
diction when the tort was committed, the United States would be ac-
countable for the action, Congress has passed a criminal statute defining
the conduct as an offense against the law of nations, and that federal
statute provides a private right of action.
The Justice Department further argued that neither treaties, the
United Nations Charter, the Alien Tort Statute, nor customary interna-
tional law grant plaintiffs in Trajano a private right of action. It claimed
that only Congress or a court acting pursuant to express legislative au-
thority can confer a private right of action, and that 28 U.S.C. § 1350
should not be construed as such authority, but as solely jurisdictional. 9
Myres S. McDougal, Frank Newman, Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Oscar Schachter, Henry Steiner,
David Weissbrodt, and Burns Weston.
7. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala 630 F.2d 876 (2nd Cir. 1980), see infra appendix.
8. See Memorandum for the U.S. as Amicus Curiae submitted in Trajano (No. 86-2448).
9. The Justice Department answered the Ninth Circuit's second question by claiming
that the court should not now decide the applicability of the "act of state doctrine" because the
cases at issue are not cognizable under 28 U.S.C. § 1350.
The Department answered the Ninth Circuit's third question in two short paragraphs,
stating that the case would not embarrass the relations between the United States and the
Philippines. As support for its argument, it noted that the government of the Philippines has
submitted an amicus curiae brief in favor of deciding the case on its merits.
1988]
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II. AMICUS CURIAE MEMORANDUM ON BEHALF OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW SCHOLARS AND
PRACTITIONERS IN SUPPORT OF
PLAINTIFFS IN TRAJANO v.
MARCOS
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether the Alien Tort Statute10 confers federal jurisdiction and a
cause of action in a suit in which aliens allege that a former foreign gov-
ernmental official, who now resides and has been served with process in
the United States, committed torts against them abroad in violation of
customary international human rights law.
INTEREST OF AMICI
Amici, the lawyer and law professors named below, submit this
memorandum in response to arguments regarding the Alien Tort Statute
advanced in the Justice Department's amicus curiae brief filed on Octo-
ber 29, 1987 ("J.D. Br."). In that brief, the Justice Department reversed
the position regarding the Alien Tort Statute previously taken by the
United States in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala.11 In Filartiga, the Second Cir-
cuit adopted the United States' assertion that an alien may enforce in a
federal court the right under customary international law to be free from
torture, and that the Alien Tort Statute therefore conferred jurisdiction
upon the district court to adjudicate an alien's claim that a Paraguayan
governmental official, who was present and had been served with process
in the United States, had committed torture in Paraguay in violation of
the law of nations.
Amici believe that Filartiga is a sound and correct statement of the
law, and that the cases consolidated in this appeal are on all fours with
Filartiga. Amici therefore urge this Court to reject the Justice Depart-
ment's novel and unprecedented interpretation of the Alien Tort Statute,
which would bring this Court into direct conflict with the Second
Circuit.
Amici include law professors who have published widely in the ar-
eas of international human rights, the relationship between United States
10. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
11. 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); See Memorandum for the United States as Amicus Cu-
riae submitted in Filartiga, reprinted in 19 I.L.M. 585, 604 (1980) [hereinafter "Government
Filartiga Memorandum"] (attached to this Memorandum as Appendix A reprinted Infra p.
34.).
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law and international law, and the enforceability of international law in
domestic courts.12 Some have served as legal counselors to the State De-
partment; others have served in the Justice Department. One amicus,
William T. Lake, is a practicing attorney who formerly served as Princi-
pal Deputy Legal Adviser to the Department of State. Briefly, amici's
affiliations and qualifications are as follows:
Professor Anthony D'Amato is a Professor of International Law at
Northwestern University Law School, who has written widely on the
Alien Tort Statute and international law. He is co-author, with Richard
Falk and Burns Weston, of International Law and World Order (1980).
He has been a member of the Executive Council of the American Society
of International Law, and is a member of the Board of Editors of the
American Journal of International Law.
Professor Lori F. Damrosch is an Associate Professor at Columbia
Law School, where she teaches and writes in the area of public interna-
tional law and foreign relations law. During the Carter Administration,
she served as Special Assistant to the Legal Adviser of the State
Department.
Professor Drew S. Days, III is a Professor of Law at the Yale Law
School, where he teaches and writes in the areas of federal jurisdiction,
civil procedure, and constitutional law. As Assistant Attorney General
for the Civil Rights Division of the Department of Justice in the Carter
Administration, he was on the United States' amicus curiae memoran-
dum in Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. He also served as a member of the United
States delegation to the Madrid meeting on the Helsinki Accords in
1980.
Professor Richard Falk is the Albert G. Milbank Professor of Inter-
national Law and Practice at Princeton University. He has served as a
Vice-President of the American Society of International Law, and has
written several books on international law, including The Role of Domes-
tic Courts in the International Legal Order (1964).
Professor Michael Glennon is a Professor of International Law at
the University of California at Davis. He has written widely in interna-
12. On questions of customary international law, the courts have long looked to "the
works ofjurists and commentators, who by years of labor, research, and experience have made
themselves peculiarly well aquainted with the subject of which they treat." The Paquete Ha-
bana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). See also United States v. Smith, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 153, 160-
61 (1820); Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 880-81. Article 38.1(d) of the Statute of the Court of Interna-
tional Justice, 59 Stat. 1055, T.S. 993, 3 Bevans 1179, expressly declares that "the teachings of
the most highly qualified publicists of the various nations... [are] subsidiary means for the
determination of rules of [international] law."
19s88
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tional and foreign relations law, including most recently, Foreign Rela-
tions and National Security Law (1987) (co-author). He was counsel to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from 1977-80.
Professor Claudio Grossman is a Professor of International Law at
the Washington College of Law at American University, where he is the
Director of International Legal Studies. He has been a consultant to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights.
Professor Joan Hartman is a Professor of International Law at the
University of Washington Law School in Seattle, Washington.
Professor Harold Koh is an Associate Professor of Law at the Yale
Law School. He has written on the Alien Tort Statute and, as an attor-
ney at the Office of Legal Counsel at the Justice Department, was on the
Justice Department's amicus curiae brief to the Supreme Court in Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic. 3
Mr. William T. Lake is a partner at the Washington law firm of
Wilmer, Cutler and Pickering. From 1980-81, he served as Principal
Deputy Legal Adviser of the Department of State. In that capacity, he
was on the United States' amicus curiae memorandum in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala.
Professor Cynthia Lichtenstein is a Professor of International Law
at Boston College Law School, and a Vice-President of the American
Society of International Law.
Professor Richard Lillich is the Howard W. Smith Professor of Law
at the University of Virginia. He is co-author, with Frank Newman, of
International Human Rights: Problems of Law and Policy (1979).
Professor Jules Lobel is an Associate Professor at the University of
Pittsburgh School of Law. He has written extensively on the application
of international law as part of United States law.
Professor Myres S. McDougal is Sterling Professor of Law Emeritus
at the Yale Law School. He has served as President of the American
Society of International Law, and has written numerous books on inter-
national law, including International Law in Contemporary Perspective:
The Public Order of the World Community (1981) (co-author).
Professor Frank Newman is the Ralston Professor of International
Law at the University of California at Berkeley. He is a retired Justice of
the California Supreme Court, and he is co-author, with Richard Lillich,
of International Human Rights: Problems of Law and Policy (1979).
Professor Stefan A. Riesenfeld is the Emmanuel S. Heller Professor
13. 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985), reprinted In 24
I.L.M. 427 (1985).
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of Law Emeritus at the University of California at Berkeley. He was
former Counselor on International Law to the State Department, and
was on the United States' amicus curiae memorandum in Filartiga v.
Pena-Irala. He is an Honorary Vice-President of the American Society
of International Law.
Professor Oscar Schachter is Hamilton Fish Professor Emeritus of
International Law and Diplomacy at Columbia University. He was for-
merly an attorney for the State Department, Director of the General
Legal Division of the United Nations, President of the American Society
of International Law, and Co-Editor-in-Chief of the American Journal of
International Law. He is co-author of International Law: Cases and
Materials (1986), and is an advisor to the American Law Institute's Re-
statement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States.
Professor Henry A. Steiner is a Professor of Law and director of the
Human Rights Program at the Harvard Law School. He has published
articles on international law and human rights and is co-author of a
course book on both topics, with Detlev Vagts, Transnational Legal
Problems (1986).
Professor David Weissbrodt is a Professor of International Law at
the University of Minnesota Law School. He has written over 50 arti-
cles, many of which relate to international human rights.
Professor Bums H. Weston is the Bessie Dutton Murray Distin-
guished Professor of Law at the University of Iowa. He is a member of
the Editorial Boards of the American Journal of International Law and
the Human Rights Quarterly, and has published more than 50 books and
articles on international law, human rights, and foreign relations, includ-
ing International Law and World Order (1980) (co-author).
INTRODUCTION
The Alien Tort Statute14 grants the federal district courts "original
jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." In Filar-
tiga v. Pena-Irala,' aliens invoked that statute to sue an alien govern-
mental official in a U.S. district court for torture that he had committed
overseas. The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
found jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, after determining that an
international consensus existed that torture violated customary interna-
tional human rights, thus constituting a "tort... committed in violation
14. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1988).
15. 630 F.2d 876.
1988]
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of the law of nations." On remand, the district court awarded plaintiffs a
$10.4 million judgment.16
In holding that the Alien Tort Statute supplied a domestic remedy
for customary human rights violations, the Second Circuit relied heavily
upon an amicus curiae memorandum filed by the United States Justice
and State Departments.1 7 That memorandum argued that the Alien Tort
Statute granted the federal courts subject matter jurisdiction to provide
such a remedy, and that "a refusal to recognize a private cause of action
in these circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our na-
tion's commitment to the protection of human rights."'
8
Since Filartiga, the federal courts have developed a sound jurispru-
dence based upon the principles articulated by the Second Circuit and
the United States in that case. The Second Circuit recently reaffirmed
Filartiga in Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic,19 and
several district courts have followed it to hear suits brought by aliens
against other aliens for torts committed abroad in violation of interna-
tional law.20 In the only other circuit court decision addressing the ques-
tion whether the Alien Tort Statute authorizes aliens to sue other aliens
for torts committed abroad in violation of international law, Tel-Oren v.
Libyan Arab Republic,2 Judge Edwards fully endorsed the Second Cir-
cuit's Filartiga approach,22 while Judge Bork took great pains to distin-
guish Filartiga from the case before him.23 With few exceptions, this line
of cases has received strong, virtually unanimous approval from the in-
16. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
17. Drew S. Days, III, William T. Lake, and Stefan A. Riesenfeld, three of the amici on
whose behalf this memorandum has been filed, were on the Government's Filarlga
Memorandum.
18. Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, 19 I.L.M. at 604.
19. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421 (2d Cir. 1987)
(editors' note: Since the filing of this brief, the Second Circuit's decision in Amerada Hess was
reversed by the Supreme Court on other grounds. 109 S. Ct. 683 (1989), The Supreme Court's
decision rests on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, and does not question the interpreta-
tion of section 1350.).
20. See, eg., Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987)(Jensen, 3.); Von
Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985)(Parker, J.).
21. Tel Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470
U.S. 1003 (1985).
22. Id. at 775-82.
23. Id. at 819-20. The third member of the D.C. Circuit's panel, the late Judge Robb,
argued that the issue of the statutory construction involved in Tel-Oren raised a political ques-
tion. See id. 823-27 (Robb, J., concurring). But as the Supreme Court has recently held,
"under the Constitution, one of the judiciary's characteristic roles is to interpret statutes, and
[judges] cannot shirk this responsibility merely because [their decision] may have significant
political overtones." Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 106 S. Ct. 2860, 2866
(1986).
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ternational legal academy.24
The cases consolidated in this appeal are on all fours with Filartiga.
In each case, alien plaintiffs sue Ferdinand Marcos, a former foreign gov-
ernmental official, for torts arising, inter alia, out of torture he allegedly
committed abroad "in violation of the law of nations." Thus, a straight-
forward application of the principles urged by the United States and ap-
plied by the Second Circuit in Filartiga would demand that this Court
hear plaintiffs' claim. Yet in an amicus brief that the State Department
has not joined, the Justice Department reverses the position it took in
Filartiga only eight years ago, now suggesting that jurisdiction should be
denied and the suits dismissed. The Justice Department dismisses the
construction of the Alien Tort Statute that it previously endorsed, and
which both the courts and commentators have consistently approved, as
"'simply frivolous.' "25 Instead, the Department asks this Court to
reconstrue section 1350 in a way that would not only effectively amend
it, but also nullify it.
Under the Justice Department's reinterpretation, the Alien Tort
Statute would not provide jurisdiction, as Congress intended, over "any
civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law
of nations," but only over those suits where, in addition: (1) the tort was
committed by "citizens of the United States or other persons subject to
its jurisdiction" at the time the tort was committed,26 (2) "under circum-
stances in which the United States might be held accountable to the of-
fended nation,"27 (3) Congress has specifically passed a criminal statute
defining the conduct as an offense against the law of nations,28 and (4)
alien plaintiffs can demonstrate "a private right of action" derived from
that federal statute.29 None of these novel jurisdictional "conditions" the
Justice Department would now impose appear anywhere in the text or
legislative history of the statute, or in the considerable body of judicial
precedent construing it. Instead, they appear to derive only from the
24. The only prominent exceptions are the much-criticized opinion of Judge Bork in Tel-
Oren, see infra note 76, and portions of a single law review article cited by the Justice Depart-
ment throughout its brief. See J.D. Br. at 8, 11, 16, 25, (citing Casto, The Federal Courts'
Protective Jurisdiction Over Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L.
REv. 467 (1986). As amici note below, however, even that article ultimately does not support
the Department's position. See infra note 85.
25. J.D. Br. at 20 (quoting Casto, supra note 24, at 480).
26. J.D. Br. at 15.
27. Id
28. Id at 26-27.
29. Id at 9-10.
1988]
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Justice Department's ill-conceived notions of the relationship between in-
ternational and domestic law.
Amici respectfully urge this Court to reject the Justice Department's
reinterpretation. The opinions of persons in the Justice Department may
change with the political winds, but questions of statutory construction,
federal jurisdiction and international law should not. Rather than creat-
ing a split with the Second Circuit, this Court should follow the ap-
proach that the United States urged and that the Second Circuit
endorsed in Filartiga, which a strong line of precedent has now followed.
This Court should hold, as the Second Circuit tersely put it, that "the
Alien Tort Statute means what it says."' 30 The Alien Tort Statute plainly
says that the federal courts have original jurisdiction over "any civil ac-
tion by an alien for a tort only, in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States." Moreover, courts, commentators, and exec-
utive branch officials have consistently interpreted that statute to provide
a cause of action as well as a federal forum for aliens who have suffered
torts in violation of the law of nations.
In this memorandum, amici make two arguments. First, section
1350 jurisdiction is proper where, as here, aliens sue for tortious injuries
committed in violation of customary international law, and the alleged
tortfeasor has sufficient contacts with the forum to render him liable to
suit there. Nothing in the language, history, or pupose of section 1350
supports the Justice Department's attempts to restrict the statute's juris-
dictional scope. The statute's original purpose was to ensure that aliens'
tort claims raising issues of international law could be adjudicated in fed-
eral rather than state courts.
To adopt the Justice Department's proposed amendment to the
plain meaning of the statute would be tantamount to reversing the stat-
ute's purpose, by redirecting virtually all aliens' tort suits involving viola-
tions of the law of nations into state courts. To adopt an interpretation
of the Alien Tort Statute that would lead to state court adjudications of
these claims would disserve the interests of the United States in the world
community, and would show grave disrespect for this nation's federal
responsibility in the development, articulation, and enforcement of inter-
national law. John Jay's admonition is as true today as it was two hun-
dred years ago, when the Alien Tort Statute was enacted:
[U]nder the national government, treaties and articles of treaties, as
well as the laws of nations, will always be expounded in one sense, and
30. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic, 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir.
1987).
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executed in the same manner - whereas adjudications on the same
points and questions, in thirteen States... will not always accord or be
consistent .... The wisdom of the convention in committing such ques-
tions to the jurisdiction and judgment of courts appointed by, and
responsible only to one national Governmen4 cannot be too much
commended3
Second, amici deny that any support exists for the Justice Depart-
ment's proposed requirement that alien plaintiffs demonstrate a private
right of action derived from some statute other than section 1350. The
courts have repeatedly held, and the Justice Department has historically
asserted, that section 1350 itself provides both a forum and a cause of
action for aliens who suffer torts in violation of customary international
law. To superimpose at this late date the requirement of an additional
cause of action would violate Congress' intent in enacting section 1350.
Moreover, as the United States maintained in Filartiga, customary inter-
national law itself provides individuals with a right to seek domestic judi-
cial relief for the egregious human rights violations alleged here.32
In sum, neither of the Justice Department's contentions regarding
the Alien Tort Statute find any support in statutory language, judicial
precedent, or legislative history. They rest almost entirely on a misun-
derstanding of the relationship between international law and United
States law. To adopt that view and promote that misunderstanding
would cause far broader disruption and confusion even than the circuit
split that the Department advocates. This Court should therefore affirm
the widely accepted principles set forth by the Second Circuit in Filar-
iga, and reject the Justice Department's invitation to break new and mis-
conceived ground in international jurisprudence.
31. THE FEDERALIST No. 3, at 43 (J. Jay) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961) (emphasis added). Even
Professor Casto, upon whom the Justice Department relies heavily in its amicus brief, see supra
note 24, recognizes the danger of narrowly construing the Alien Tort Statute:
The availability of state courts to try claims arguably within section 1350 means
that a narrow construction of the Act will not limit the adjuducation of aliens'
claims. Because the excluded cases may still be filed in state court, a narrow con-
struction would vest the state courts with initial and perhaps final responsibility for
shaping the course of litigation implicating foreign relations. To ensure the federal
courts'participation in the development and application of legal principles pertinent to
aliens' claims, a national forum should be available for adjudication.
Casto, supra note 24, at 510 (emphasis added).
32. Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, 19 LLM. at 604.
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ARGUMENT
I. RECOGNIZING JURISDICTION UNDER 28
U.S.C. § 1350 IN THESE CASES 'WOULD
FURTHER CONGRESS' INTENT
TO PROVIDE OR RECOGNIZE A FEDERAL FORUM
FOR ALIEN TORT CLAIMS ALLEGING
INTERNATIONAL LAW VIOLATIONS.
A. Filartiga and Its Progeny Compel a Finding of Section 1350
Jurisdiction in These Cases.
In considering the threshold jurisdictional question, this Court does
not write on a clean slate. Since 1980, section 1350 litigation has prolif-
erated, and a clear jurisdictional analysis has emerged from the resulting
precedent. In Filartiga, Amerada Hess, Forti,3 3 Von Dardel,34 and Adra
v. Clift,35 federal courts exercised section 1350 jurisdiction over tort
claims by aliens for torts committed abroad by persons not subject to
United States jurisdiction at the time the tort was committed. Yet in
urging this Court to take a different path, the Justice Department fails to
note, much less discuss and distinguish, the jurisdictional analysis that
has guided these courts.
That analysis rests on the principle that Congress intended to pro-
vide aliens with the choice of a federal remedy in these cases because they
raise international law issues, and should not ordinarily be litigated in
state courts. Thus, the Second Circuit stated in Filartiga:
Common law courts of general jurisdiction regularly adjudicate transi-
tory tort claims between individuals over whom they exercise personal
jurisdiction, wherever the tort occurred. Moreover, as part of an articu-
lated scheme of federal control over external affairs, Congress pro-
videed, in the First Judiciary Act, § 9(b), 1 Stat. '73, 77 (1789), for
federal jurisdiction over suits by aliens where principles of interna-
tional law are in issue.36
Judge Edwards, concurring in Tel-Oren, similarly noted that the Framers
gave aliens who have suffered torts committed in violation of interna-
tional law the option to go to federal court, whatever the amount in con-
troversy, to ensure that a state court's unfair adjudication of a transitory
33. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
34. Von Dardel v. USSR, 627 F. Supp. 246 (D.D.C. 1985).
35. Adra v. Clift, 195 F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1961).
36. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 885 (2d Cir. 1980) (emphasis added).
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tort would not be cause for an international conflict" In a recent dis-
trict court decision in this Circuit, Judge Jensen also noted the transitory
tort doctrine and stated that "[i]t would appear that Congress intended
§ 1350 to provide concurrent federal jurisdiction over alien tort claims
alleging treaty or customary international law violations in order to facil-
itate federal oversight of matters involving foreign relations and interna-
tional law."
38
The Second Circuit's recent analysis in Amerada Hess squarely af-
firms these principles and forthrightly rejects the complicated conditions
the Justice Department would now superimpose on section 1350:
"Although seldom employed, the Alien Tort Statute means what it says.
If an alien brings a suit, for a tort only, that sufficiently alleges a violation
of the law of nations, then the district court has jurisdiction.1
39
The Justice Department does not even cite these cases in the juris-
dictional section of its brief, despite their manifest relevance to the issue
at hand. Indeed, the Justice Department remains oddly silent even with
respect to the decided cases in which federal courts have denied section
1350 jurisdiction. The vast majority of those cases have declined juris-
diction on the ground that the tort alleged was not committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations." But not a single court has suggested, as the
Justice Department now does, that aliens may invoke section 1350 to
redress only those torts occurring in U.S. territory, or that have been
committed by United States citizens or by persons subject to United
States jurisdiction at the time the tort is committed.4"
37. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 782-86 (D.C. Cir. 1984), cert. de-
nied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
38. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1540 n.6 (N.D. Cal. 1987). The court in
Adra v. Clift noted further that, given Congress' decision to accord aliens a federal forum, the
courts should be extremely reluctant to negate Congress' intent:
An alien, understandably though unjustifiably, may prefer to bring an action for a
tort in a federal court rather than in a local court, and Congress has authorized him to
do so in this limited class of cases. The importance of foreign relations to our country
today cautions federal courts to give weight to such considerations and not to decline
jurisdiction given by an Act of Congress unless required to do so by dominant
considerations.
195 F. Supp. 857, 865 (D. Md. 1961)(emphasis added). See also Valanga v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 259 F. Supp. 324, 328 (E.D. Pa. 1966)(Section 1350 designed to embrace cases with
"international overtones" and presenting issues of "international import").
39. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp. v. Argentine Republic., 830 F.2d 421, 425 (2d Cir.
1987).
40. See ag., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 795-96 (Edwards, ., concurring)(universal consensus
does not yet exist to establish terrorist attacks as a law of nations violation); Guinto v. Marcos,
654 F.Supp. 276, 280 (S.D. Cal. 1986) (violation of the First Amendment right of free speech
does not rise to the level of a violation of the law of nations).
41. See Randall, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Law Claimr Inquiries into the
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B. The History of the Alien Tort Statute Fully Supports the
Filartiga Approach.
The jurisdictional analysis that these courts have applied fully com-
ports with the historical purpose of the Alien Tort Statute, namely, to
ensure aliens the choice of litigating torts that violate international law in
a federal, rather than a state, forum. Because defendant in this action,
former President Ferdinand Marcos, now lives in Hawaii, plaintiffs could
have brought these tort actions against him in Hawaiian state courts
under the well-established common law doctrine of "transitory torts."
Under that doctrine, which the Supreme Court has dated to Lord Mans-
field's 1774 opinion in Mostyn v. Fabrigas,42 injuries to a person are
"transitory," in the sense that a plaintiff's right to redress follows the
defendant even to foreign lands. 43 The Alien Tort Statute simply pro-
vides that where such torts also violate international law, an alien plain-
tiff may choose to bring the action in federal, rather than state, court.
Plaintiffs in these consolidated appeals chose a federal forum, and Con-
gress intended that that choice be honored.
The Alien Tort Statute was part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789,
which sought to implement Congress' constitutional power to prescribe
lower federal court jurisdiction by placing questions of national import,
such as those involving the law of nations or treaties, under the control of
federal courts.' The Alien Tort Statute reflects Congress' and the Fram-
ers' concern that matters touching on foreign relations and international
law should be susceptible to adjudication in federal court. The Supreme
Court has accordingly described section 1350 as one of several statutes:
"reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings with for-
eign nations and.., a desire to give matters of intermational significance
Alien Tort Statute, 18 N.Y.U. INT'L L. & POL. 1, 62 (1985) (Alien Tort Statute jurisdiction
"has never been denied on the ground that the statute itself does not confer jurisdiction over
extraterritorial tort actions").
42. Mostyn v. Fabrigas, 1 Cowp. 161 (1774), cited in McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (I How.)
241, 248 (1843).
43. The Alien Tort Statute was part of the First Judiciary Act of 1789. The author of that
Act, Oliver Ellsworth, had himself applied the transitory tort doctrine in 1786, while a sitting
judge. See Stoddard v. Bird, 1 Kirby 65, 68 (Conn. 1786)(Ellswortli, J.)("right of action [for a
tort] against an administrator is transitory, and the action may be brought wherever he is
found"). The Supreme Court has applied the transitory tort doctrine to uphold state jurisdic.
tion over out-of-state torts, McKenna v. Fisk, 42 U.S. (1 How.) :241 (1843)(personal injury
suit); Dennick v. Railroad Co., 103 U.S. 11 (1881)(wrongful death action); as well as torts
occurring on foreign soil. Slater v. Mexican National R.R. Co., 194 U.S. 120, 126 (1904).
44. See generally Dickinson, The Law of Nations as Part of the National Law of the United
States (pt. 1), 101 U. PA. L. REV. 26, 34-55 (1952).
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to the jurisdiction of federal institutions.' 45
Commentators who have studied the legislative history of the First
Judiciary Act, and particularly that of the Alien Tort Statute, unani-
mously conclude that section 1350 "was intended to avoid local bias in
aliens' suits and to obtain uniform judicial interpretation and application
of the law in cases implicating international concerns."" The Framers'
concern, as founders of a small and weak nation, was that if the state
courts failed to do justice to an alien's tort claim, that denial of justice
might inspire the alien's nation to make war on the United States. Thus,
Alexander Hamilton argued forcefully for federal jurisdiction over all
cases involving aliens:
The Union will undoubtedly be answerable to foreign powers for the
conduct of its members. And the responsibility for an injury ought
ever to be accompanied with the faculty of preventing it. As the denial
or perversion of justice by the sentences of courts, as well as in any
other manner, is with reason classed among the just causes of war, it
will follow that the federal judiciary ought to have cognizance of all
causes in which the citizens of other countries are concerned. This is
not less essential to the preservation of the public faith, than to the
security of the public tranquility. A distinction may perhaps be
imagined between cases arising upon treaties and the laws of nations
and those which may stand merely on the footing of the municipal law.
The former kind may be supposed proper for the federal jurisdiction, the
latter for that of the States. But it is at least problematical, whether an
unjust sentence against a foreigner, where the subject of controversy
was wholly relative to the lex loci, would not, if unredressed, be an
aggression upon his sovereign, as well as one which violated the stipu-
lations in treaty or the general law of nations.
And a still greater objection to the distinction would result from the
immense difficulty, if not impossibility, of a practical discrimination
45. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964). Few of these
jurisdictional statutes provide for exclusivejurisdiction in the federal courts, which would have
been unacceptable to that contingent of the Framers that strongly favored states' rights. The
legislative purpose underlying most of these statutes was not to bar those claims from state
court, but to ensure that the federal courts would be open to them. Thus, the Alien Tort
Statute gives aliens the choice to sue in federal court, but permits them to go to state court
instead if they so choose.
46. See, eg., Note, Enforcing the Customary International Law of Human Rights in Fed-
eral Court, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 127, 132-33 (1986) [hereinafter Note, Enforcing the Customary
International Law]. Accord, D'Amato, What Does Tel-Oren Tell Lawyers?, 79 AM. J. Ihr'L L.
92 (1985); Randall, supra note 41, at 11-31; Casto, supra note 24, at 472; Comment, After Tel-
Oren: Should Federal Courts Infer a Cause of Action Under the Alien Tort Claims Act?, 3
DICKINSON J. INT'L L. 281, 283 (1985); Note, Separation of Powers and Adjudication of
Human Rights Claims Under the Alien Tort Claims Act, 60 WASH. L REv. 697, 699 (1985)
[hereinafter Note, Separation of Powers].
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between the cases of one complexion and those of the other. So great a
proportion of the cases in which foreigners are paries, involve national
questions that it is by far most safe and most expedient to refer all those
in which they are concerned to the national tribunals.47
Particularly with respect to aliens' claims raising substantive questions of
international law, this concern even predated the Constitution.48
The Alien Tort Statute was Congress' response to all of these con-
cerns. It was designed to direct cases involving issues of foreign relations
and international law into the federal judiciary. By so doing, it also di-
minished the possibility that the United States would find itself answer-
ing to another nation for a state court's denial of justice to an alien who
had unsuccessfully sought redress against residents of that state for tort
claims involving international law violations.4 9
C. The Justice Department Asks this Court to Nullify the Alien Tort
Statute by Judicial Construction.
The Justice Department acknowledges that the Alien Tort Statute
was motivated by the "Framers' concern that the United States might
become involved in an international incident if it fitled to provide a fair
forum for an alien seeking redress."50 The Department then asks this
47. THE FEDERALIST, No. 80 at 476-77 (A. Hamilton) (emphasis added). See also THi
FEDERALIST, No. 3 at 43 (J. Jay); 3 The Debates in the Several State Conventions on the
Adoption of the Federal Constitution 530-36 (Madison)(J.Elniot ed. 1836); see also D'Amato,
The Alien Tort Statute and the Founding of the Constitution, 82 Am. J. INT'L L. 62 (1988).
48. The Continental Congress, which lacked the legislative power to do more, exhorted
the states to enact legislation providing judicial remedies, both criminal and civil, for violations
of treaties of the United States and the law of nations. 21 J. CONT. CONO. 1136-37 (1781).
Both Edmund Randolph and James Madison complained at the Constitutional Convention of
the Continental Congress' inability to give effect to the law of nations under the Articles of
Confederation. 1 M. Farrand, The records of the Federal Convention of 1787 24-25
(191 1)(Randolph); id. at 316 (Madison); see also Casto, supra note 24, at 490-94. And as the
Justice Department correctly points out, J.D. Br. at 10-11, the 1784 Marbols incident - in
which an alien who assaulted a foreign diplomat was tried criminally in a state court - raised
grave concern, precisely because it demonstrated the federal government's vulnerability when
international law claims were cognizable only in state courts. See, ag., Randall, supra note 41,
at 24-28.
Where the Department errs, however, is in assuming that the Marbols incident inspired
the Congress that enacted the Alien Tort statute to reach only those international law viola-
tions that "occurred within the legislative jurisdiction of the United States and under circum-
stances in which the United States might be viewed as responsible under international law."
J.D. Br. at 11. As one commentator has noted, "the statute was drafted more broadly than
would have been necessary to provide civil jurisdiction in only that case." Randall, supra note
41, at 27.
49. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 783; Randall, supra note 41, at 20-
22.
50. J.D. Br. at 8.
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Court, however, to rewrite the statute to address that concern in a way
that Congress never intended. Eschewing Congress' chosen language for
the statute, which grants jurisdiction for "any civil action by an alien for
a tort only, in violation of the law of nations" (emphasis added), the
Justice Department would limit section 1350 jurisdiction to those actions
brought by aliens for (1) torts committed by "United States Citizens or
other persons subject to its jurisdiction,"51 (2) where the tortfeasor is
subject to United States jurisdiction at the time when the tort was com-
mitted,52 and (3) where "a cause of action is afforded by federal law of
the United States enacted pursuant to the Law of Nations Clause [of the
Constitution],53 in order to 'define and punish' violations of the law of
nations that are the responsibility of the United States."'
None of these limitations finds any support in the statutory lan-
guage. The plain language of the Alien Tort Statute authorizes jurisdic-
tion over "any" alien's action for a tort in violation of international law,
whoever the tortfeasor may be and wherever the tort may have occurred,
and does not require the enactment of any other statute.55 "Absent a
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, the statutory lan-
guage must be regarded as conclusive."' 56 Yet in arguing for a dramatic
new restriction on Congress' choice of the inclusive term "any," the Jus-
51. J.D. Br. at 19.
52. Although the Justice Department never expressly states that Alien Tort defendants
must be subject to United States jurisdiction when they committed the tort, that conclusion
follows inevitably from its recommendation that this Court deny § 1350jurisdiction over these
cases. Otherwise, the Justice Department would be urging this Court to recognize jurisdiction
here, for clearly former President Marcos is "a person subject to [United States] jurisdiction"
now that he is a resident of Hawaii, just as Pena-Irala was subject to United States jurisdiction
in Filartiga. See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 878 ("whenever an alleged torturer is found and served
with process by an alien within our borders, § 1350 provides federal jurisdiction").
53. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
54. J.D. Br. at 9-10.
55. This does not mean, of course, that every tort somehow connected to an international
law violation would proceed to judgment in a federal court. There are substantial procedural
limitations on such suits, including, most importantly, the threshold requirements that the
tortfeasor be subject to service of process and amenable to personal jurisdiction here. In addi-
tion, doctrines such as standing, sovereign and official immunity, the act of state doctrine,
exhaustion of local remedies, and forum non conveniens may play a part in determining
whether federal courts will in fact decide many of these Alien Tort actions. For an enumera-
tion and discussion of these procedural limitations, see Koh, Civil Remedies for Uncivil
Wrongs: Combatting Terrorism Through Transnational Public Law Litigation, 22 T INT'L
LJ. 169, 181-84, 202-08 (1987). Through a straightforward application of the above princi-
ples, a federal judge could protect his docket from unmeritorious § 1350 suits, without ac-
cepting the strained jurisdictional reading of the statute that the Department now urges.
56. Tulalip Tribes v. FERC, 732 F.2d 1451, 1455 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Consumer Prod.
Safety Comm'n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980).
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tice Department offers only conjecture and speculation." The Justice
Department speculates, for example, that the Framers were concerned
with providing remedies, not for all violations of the law of nations that
harmed aliens and that would otherwise be adjudicable in state courts,
but only for those for which the United States itself could be held legally
responsible.5" Nothing in the Framers' statements, the legislative history
of the statute, or its subsequent interpretations by courts, commentators,
or the Executive Branch itself, suggests that this limitation on the express
language was contemplated, let alone intended.
The Justice Department's speculation, moreover, appears based
upon fundamental misunderstandings of both the nature of our nation's
international obligations and the scope of the Framers' concerns for uni-
formity in international law cases involving aliens. The Justice Depart-
ment argues, for example, that the scope of civil jurisdiction under the
Alien Tort Statute should be determined and limited by principles and
legislative actions concerning criminal jurisdiction.59 With all due re-
spect, the Justice Department's confusion over civil and criminal actions
should not be attributed to the Framers of the Alien Tort Statute.
60
Our nation's obligations and enforcement powers under interna-
tional law are not limited solely to criminal enforcement of those selected
laws of nations that Congress has chosen to "define and punish" by crim-
inal statute. As amici have demonstrated, the Framers feared that the
aliens remitted solely to state court remedies would more likely suffer
denials of justice. 61 "The denial or perversion of justice by the sentences
57. J.D. Br. at 12-20.
58. J.D. Br. at 15.
59. J.D. Br. at 9-10, 13-14.
60. The Justice Department attempts to lend its confusion an air of constitutional respect-
ability by suggesting that the constitutional basis for 28 U.S.C. § 1350 derives solely from
Congress' power "[t]o define and punish ... offenses against the Law of Nations," under
Article I, § 8, Clause 10. J.D. Br. at 10 ("the Alien Tort Statute was passed only two years
after the Constitution was adopted and implements the Law of Nations Clause of the Constitu-
tion."). Yet this argument ignores the Statute's real constitutional basis, namely, the "arising
under" clause of Article III of the Constitution and Congress' power to create lower federal
courts and to prescribe their jurisdiction. See U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; art. III, §§ 1 & 2.
The question whether a tort has been committed in violation of the law of nations "necessarily
raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset, and hence clearly 'arises under'
federal law, as that term is used in Article III." Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank of Nigeria,
461 U.S. 480, 493 (1983). This would be true regardless of whether the suit was later tried
under a substantive standard of liability prescribed by municipal law, see infra note 99, or by
international law, see infra Part IIB. Thus, whatever substantive limitations the Department
might seek to read into article I's Law of Nations Clause, J.D. 1r. at 18, clearly would not
apply to the Alien Tort Statute, which rests upon these other souxces of congressional power.
61. See supra notes 45, 46, and accompanying text.
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of courts" was precisely Hamilton's concern.62 He argued that the
United States might be held internationally responsible for "an unjust
sentence against a foreigner."63 Certainly that was true where the state
courts had rendered a decision "which violated the stipulations in a
treaty or the general law of nations."" To insure that our international
law obligations to avoid a "denial or perversion of justice" was fulfilled,
Congress drafted section 1350 broadly, to provide civil access in federal
court to aliens for "any" tort committed against them - whoever the
tortfeasor may be, wherever the tort may have occurred, and without
regard to Congress' criminal enactments - so long as that tort was
committed in violation of the law of nations. The Department's narrow
construction of section 1350, which makes the availability of civil relief
for international law violations contingent upon Congress' domestic deci-
sions to impose criminal sanctions for those acts, simply ignores this im-
portant aspect of our international obligations. The differences between
criminal enforcement of international law and the provision of civil judi-
cial access are also reflected in the customary international law doctrines
governing "jurisdiction to prescribe and enforce" and "jurisdiction to ad-
judicate."65 The former govern the state's power to "make its law appli-
cable to [personal] activities, relations, or status," principally by
legislation, and to "induce or compel compliance or punish non-compli-
ance... with its laws," while the latter concerns a state's authority "to
subject persons or things to the process of its courts or administrative
tribunals."
66
The international comity concerns that restrain a nation's attempts
to legislate or punish criminal conduct that occurs abroad - for exam-
ple, by criminalizing attacks on diplomats that take place overseas - do
not equally restrain a nation from adjudicating a private tort dispute be-
tween persons within its own borders. Thus, the jurisdictional limits that
international law places upon the extraterritorial application and en-
forcement of United States criminal law do not restrict the power of
United States courts to adjudicate civil suits against alleged torturers
62. THE FEDERALIST No. 80, supra note 47, at 476 (A. Hamilton).
63. Id at 477.
64. Id Hamilton argued for an even broader proposition, that the United States could be
held responsible for an unjust sentence against a foreigner even where no international law
whatsoever was involved. While his view that all actions involving aliens should be in federal
courts did not totally prevail, both the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1982), and the Alien
Tort Statute reflect his concern.
65. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
(Proposed Final Draft) § 401 [hereinafter THIRD RESTATFMENT].
66. Id
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who are currently subject to United States judicial jurisdiction.67
In addition, the Justice Department's constricted view of section
1350's scope fails to account for the Framers' concern for uniformity, a
concern totally separate from questions regarding the United States' in-
ternational obligations. The Framers' desire to consolidate questions of
foreign relations and international law in the federal judiciary was not
limited to situations where the United States was responsible for criminal
enforcement of offenses against the law of nations. Rather, the Framers
determined, after the experiences of the Continental Congress, that all
matters of foreign relations and international law, when possible, should
be adjudicated in federal courts, as much for uniformity's sake as to
honor our specific international obligations.6"
Thus, far from providing the clear contrary authority necessary to
justify a judicial departure from section 1350's literal terms, the historical
evidence in fact supports a reading of those terms consistent with their
plain meaning: that Congress intended to provide federal jurisdiction for
"any civil action by an alien for a tort only, in violation of the law of
nations or a treaty of the United States." Because the actions consoli-
dated here for appeal allege such torts, jurisdiction lies under section
1350.
HI. PLAINTIFFS HAVE A RIGHT TO, SUE UNDER




As with the jurisdictional question, this Court will not write on a
clean slate with respect to the issue of a private cause of action. The
courts in Filartiga, Amerada Hess, Von Dardel, Forti, and Adra, as well
as Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren, all found that aliens have a right to sue
under section 1350 for torts committed against them in violation of the
law of nations. Thus, Judge Kaufman concluded in Filartiga, at the
United States' express urging, that section 1350 "open[s] the federal
courts for adjudication of the rights already recognized by international
67. Cf. Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, 19 I.L.M. at 605 (The fact
that both international law and the defendant's local law prohibit torture, "significantly
reduces the likelihood that enforcement would cause undesirable international consequences
and is therefore an additional reason to permit private enforcement" of plaintiff's claim).
68. See, eg., THE FEDERALIST No. 3 at 43 (. Jay)("The wisdom of.. .committing such
questions to the jurisdiction.. .of courts appointed by and responsible only to one national
government cannot be too much commended.").
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law."' 69 As Judge Edwards in Tel-Oren and Judge Jensen in Fort! made
clear, Filartiga has established that "section 1350 itse/fprovides a right to
sue for alleged violations of the law of nations."7
Until recently, the Justice Department had consistently supported
that view. As early as 1795, Attorney General Bradford stated that sec-
tion 1350 would provide a civil "remedy" to private British citizens for
injuries suffered in Africa at the hands of French and American citi-
zens.7 1 In 1907, Attorney General Bonaparte reiterated that the Alien
Tort Statute "provide[s] a forum and a right of action" for torts commit-
ted in violation of United States treaties or the law of nations.7 2 More
recently, the Justice Department maintained in 1980 in its memorandum
in Filartiga, that because official torture is a "tort... committed in viola-
tion of the law of nations," it gives rise to a judicially enforceable remedy
under section 1350.73
Barely acknowledging this judicial and executive precedent, the Jus-
tice Department now reverses the position it has maintained over almost
two centuries, alleging that section 1350 provides aliens no remedy at all
unless a separate private right of action can be inferred from some statute
other than section 1350. 74 Now claiming that section 1350 is "purely
69. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 887 (2d Cir. 1980).
70. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Edwards, J.,
concurring)(emphasis added); ia at 777 ("section 1350 Provides a Right of Action and a Fo-
rum")(emphasis omitted); Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
71. 1 Op. Att'y. Gen. 57, 59 (1795). Attorney General Bradford stated:
[Tihere can be no doubt that the company or individuals who have been injured by
these acts of hostility have a remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the Unitied States;
jurisdiction being expressly given to these courts in all cases where an alien sues for a
tort only, in violation of the law of nations, or of a treaty of the United States.
Ia (emphasis in original). "While opinions of the Attorney General are not binding, they are
entitled to some deference, especially where judicial decisions construing a statute are lack-
ing." Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 780 n.6 (Edwards, J., concurring); accord, Oloteo v. INS, 643 F.2d
679, 683 (9th Cir. 1981).
72. 26 Op. Atty. Gen. 250, 252-53 (1907)(emphasis added).
73. See Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, 19 I.LM. at 601-06.
74. The Department's brief mentions only the Attorney General's 1907 opinion, and of-
fers a most unconvincing rebuttal to Filartiga. The Department claims that the Attorney Ger-
eral's 1907 opinion, J.D. Br. at 20-21 n.17, arose under the "treaty" language of § 1350,
ignoring Attorney General Bonaparte's express assertions that the "statutes provide a right of
action and a forum" and that the aliens could recover under them if "the diversion of the water
was an injury to substantial rights of citizens of Mexico under the principles of international
law or by treaty, and could only be determined by judicial decision." 26 Op. Att'y Gen. 250
253 (1907)(emphasis added). The Attorney General's opinion attaches no significance, as the
Department now does, to the claims that the injury occurred in the United States and involved
a right of action "familiar to domestic law." J.D. Br. at 20-21 n.17.
The Department's attempt to distinguish Filartiga is even less persuasive. Claiming that
the Second Circuit took no position on the cause of action question, see J.D. Br. at 21-22 n.18,
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jurisdictional,"7 5 the Department asserts that neither treaties nor cus-
tomary international law create judicially enforceable rights of action in
favor of the plaintiffs, and that therefore the only remaining sources for a
right of action are federal statutes defining criminal offenses against the
law of nations.76
Amici maintain that Congress enacted section 1350 in order to pro-
vide aliens with an effective civil remedy for torts committed in violation
of the law of nations. Adoption of the Justice Department's new inter-
pretation would defeat that purpose. Whether section 1350 is viewed as
providing a cause of action itself, as the Justice Department has previ-
ously viewed it, or as merely providing a federal, forum for causes of
action arising under municipal or international law, as others have sug-
gested, plaintiffs have clearly stated a claim enforceable in federal court,
A. Section 1350 Provides a Cause of Action for Aliens Victimized by
Torts Committed in Violation of the Law of Nations.
As Judge Jensen recently held in Forti, "[t]here appears to be a
growing consensus that section 1350 provides a cause of action for cer-
the Department ignores Judge Edwards' conclusion in Tel-Oren that the "view of the Second
Circuit, which I endorse, [is] that section 1350 itself provides a light to sue for allegcd viola-
tions of the law of nations." 726 F.2d at 780 (Edwards, J., concurring). In Tel-Oren, Judge
Edwards correctly read Filartiga to hold "that aliens granted subs.tantive rights under interna-
tional law may assert them under § 1350." Id. at 780 n.5. For that reason, "[t]he existence of
an express or implied cause of action was immaterial to the jurisdictional analysis of the Sec-
ond Circuit." Id. at 780 "[E]nforceability [of the right] is established by the existence of an
individual right such a cause would seek to vindicate." Schnecbaum, The Enforceability of
Customary Norms of International Law, 8 BROOKLYN J. INT'L L. 289, 305 (1982). Thus,
plaintiffs here have a right to sue not because the law of nations "grants" them a private "cause
of action," but because, as the Government pointed out in Filartiga, "official torture is a tort
and gives rise to a judicially enforceable remedy." Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra
note 11, 19 I.L.M. at 601.
75. J.D. Br. at 20.
76. Id. at 20-31. Unlike the Justice Department's jurisdictional arguments, which find
absolutely no support in judicial opinions, the Justice Department's "cause of action" analysis
has a lone supporter: Judge Bork's concurring opinion in Tel-Oren, 726 F,2d at 798. Yet tile
Justice Department itself has previously characterized that opinion as having "little, if any
precedential value." See Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, filed in opposition to the
petition for certiorari, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, No. 83-2052 (January 1985) at 9, 24
I.L.M. 427. 432 (1985). Moreover, Judge Bork's view has never been followed by any court,
and has been criticized sharply by both courts and commentators. For criticism of Judge
Bork's view, see eg., Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 778-80, 788-91 (Edwards, J., concurring); Ford,
672 F. Supp. at 1539; D'Amato, supra note 46, at 92; Note, Enfircing the Customary Interna.
tional Law, supra note 46, at 157; Koh, supra note 55, at 203 n.i 1; Randall, Further Inquiries
Into the Alien Tort Statute and a Recommendation, 18 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 473, 479-85
(1986); Note, Separation of Powers, supra note 46, at 714; Comment, Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab
Republic: Redefining the Alien Tort Claims Act, 70 MINN. L. REV. 211 (1985).
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tain 'international common law torts.' "7 This judicial consensus is re-
flected in, and reinforced by, the scholarly literature.7
8
Congress in section 1350 authorized a private remedy for aliens who
have suffered from torts committed in violation of customary interna-
tional law. As the Second Circuit recognized, customary international
law is a developing, not a static, body of law, and "courts must interpret
[it] not as it was in 1789, but as it has evolved and exists among the
nations of the world today."7 9 Thus, section 1350 marks a choice by
Congress to vest the federal judiciary with the continuing authority to
grant aliens domestic civil remedies for international wrongs, even as in-
ternational law evolves.8"
77. Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1539 (N.D. Cal. 1987) (citing Filartiga,
630 F.2d 876); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 777-82 (D.C. Cir. 1984)(Ed-
wards, J., concurring) cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Guinto v. Marcos, 654 F. Supp. 276,
279-80 (S.D. Cal. 1986); Von Dardel v. USSR, 623 F. Supp. 246, 256-59 (S.D. Cal. 1986);
Siderman v. Republic of Argentina, No. CV 82-1772-RMT(Mex)(C.D. Cal. March 12, 1984),
vacated on other grounds (C.D. Cal. March 7, 1985)(LEXIS, Genfed Library, Dist. file).
78. See, eg., Randall, supra note 76, at 479-89 (concluding that "either by simple statu-
tory construction or by inference based on congressional intent, the requisite elements of the
Alien Tort Statute, if met, provide a plaintiff with a private cause of action"); Comment, supra
note 46, at 309-13 (applying Cort v. Ash test and finding a cause of action); Note, Separation of
Powers, supra note 46, at 714-20; Note, Limiting the Scope of Federal Jurisdiction Under the
Alien Tort Statute, 24 VA. J. IN'L. L. 941, 956-60 (1984); Comment, supra note 76, at 220;,
Blum & Steinhardt, Federal Jurisdiction Over International Human Rights Claims: The Alien
Tort Claims Act after Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 22 HARV. INT'L LI. 53, 87-97 (1981);
Schneebaum, supra note 74, at 300-07.
79. Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 881; The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 694 (1900).
80. Thus, § 1350 can be viewed as authorizing the federal courts to fashion a federal com-
mon law of domestic remedies for "torts... committed in violation of the law of nations."
Koh, supra note 55, at 186 n.64, 205-06 nn. 119, 124; Blum & Steinhardt, supra note 78, at 98-
102.
The district court on remand in Filartiga adopted this position, applying international law
to authorize punitive damages despite the fact that punitive damages were not allowed under
Paraguayan law. It held that "[b]y enacting Section 1350, Congress entrusted [the task of
enforcing international law] to federal courts, and gave them power to choose and develop
federal remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international law incorporated into United
States common law." Flartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F. Supp. at 860, 864 (E.D.N.Y. 1984); see
also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 451, 456 (1957)jurisdictional stat-
ute "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal [common] law" even where existing
common law forbade private right of action). The Justice Department does not mention the
district court's decision on remand in Filartiga, and attempts to distinguish Lincoln Mills on
the ground that labor law was "already pervasively regulated by substantive federal law." J.D.
Br. at 31 n.27. What the Department ignores is that the courts have traditionally viewed
international law and foreign relations issues at least as strongly as a federal matter. See, eg.,
Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423 (1964)("an issue concerned with a
basic choice regarding the competence and function of the Judiciary and the National Execu-
tive in ordering our relationships with other members of the international community must be
treated exclusively as an aspect of federal law"); Moore, Federalism and Foreign Affairs, 1965
DuKE L. 248, 261-84; Dickinson, supra note 44, at 792.
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In Filartiga, the Second Circuit concluded that only those norms
that command international consensus and are of "mutual, and not
merely several, concern," are directy actionable under the statute."1 The
actions alleged in these consolidated appeals - torture, summary execu-
tion, disappearance, and arbitrary detention - violate customary inter-
national human rights norms that fit that description.82 Thus, section
1350 confers a cause of action on plaintiffs to sue in federal court.
The Justice Department rejects this position, slating, virtually with-
out argument, that section 1350 "is purely jurisdictional. '8 3 Therefore, it
contends, the alien's cause of action must be derived elsewhere, possibly
in the criminal statutes Congress passes to punish "offenses against the
law of nations."84 Quoting a single law review article, the Department
dismisses the widely accepted view that section 1350 provides both a fo-
rum and a cause of action as "'simply frivolous.' -8
The Department's new interpretation wholly ignores the Supreme
Court's directive that, in determining the existence of a cause of action,
"the ultimate question is one of congressional intent."8 6 Thus, the rele-
vant question is whether the Congress that enacted section 1350 in 1789
intended that its remedial mechanism be available only to those aliens
81. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 888 (2d Cir. 1980)(citing ITT v. Vencap, 519
F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975)(Friendly, J.)).
82. See THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, at § 702.
83. J.D. Br. at 20.
84. Although the Department initially cautions that it "does not mean to suggest that
principles of international law may not be applied in United States courts unless they have first
been affirmatively enacted into law by Congress," J.D. Br. at 10 n,7, it goes on to imply that
alien plaintiffs may sue under § 1350 only when they can find civil causes of action in criminal
statutes that authorize federal prosecutors to bring criminal actions for certain law of nations
offenses. Id at 20-21. Yet the plain language of § 1350 is far more susceptible to the implica-
tion of a civil cause of action than are the various criminal statutes in which the Justice De-
partment would locate causes of action instead. See J.D. Br. at 26, 27 n.22. Section 1350 itself
explicitly confers upon a particular class of claimants - aliens - the right to bring a specific
type of civil action - "for a tort only" - under certain circumstances - when the tort has
been "committed in violation of the law of nations."
85. J.D. Br. at 20 (quoting Casto, supra note 24, at 480). Even the sole law review article
quoted by the Justice Department does not ultimately support its position. Professor Casto,
while concluding that § 1350 does not itself provide a cause of action, Casto, supra note 24, at
480, nevertheless recognizes that § 1350 might "create a federal forum in which federal judges
are given power to implement the law of nations by fashioning appropriate federal domestic
remedies." Id. Thus, he too, rejects Judge Bork's "narrow construction" of the Statute, Id. at
499-501, ultimately concluding that "[i]f the statute is construed narrowly, judicial power over
this litigation will be left primarily to the state courts. Instead, section 1350 and pertinent
provisions of Constitution should be construed as broadly as possible.... ." Id. at 525. Accord,
id. at 472. This approach, of course, is consistent with the view expressed here. See supra note
55.
86. Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560, 568 (1979).
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who could demonstrate a private right of action by inference from preex-
isting criminal statutes defining "offenses against the law of nations." It
seems most unlikely Congress so intended, given that the very notion of a
"private cause of action" did not even develop until almost seventy years
later, in 1848.87 Moreover, because no criminal statutes existed in 1789
that defined and punished offenses against the law of nations, the Justice
Department's view would have the authors of the First Judiciary Act
writing a statute that afforded federal jurisdiction over an entire class of
non-actionable "torts," a concept that would have been entirely foreign
to the Framers.
In fact, the Framers had a much simpler view: that transitory torts
were indeed actionable, and were directly actionable in federal court so
long as they had also been "committed in violation of the law of na-
tions.""8 Justice Peterson, a principal drafter of the First Judiciary Act,
"assumed, as did all his contemporaries, that domestic common law in-
corporated the law of nations and provided domestic remedies for viola-
tions of the law of nations." 9  Thus, the statute that most clearly confers
upon aliens the right to sue for law of nations violations is the Alien Tort
Statute itself.
The only substantive argument the Justice Department advances re-
garding this point refutes its own position. Arguing that "[a]nalogous
federal jurisdictional statutes likewise do not create private rights of ac-
87. See Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 238 (1979); D'Amato, supra note 46, at 95-96.
88. 1 Op Att'y Gen. 57, 59 (1795).
89. Casto, supra note 24, at 480, see also Letter from Sec. of State T. Jefferson to French
Minister (June 5, 1793), reprinted in 7 The Works of Thomas Jefferson 362, 364 (Ford ed.
1904). Federal jurisdiction to provide domestic remedies for violations of the law of nations
was recognized repeatedly in prize cases in which plaintiffs often sought restitution for seizures
of goods that allegedly violated the law of nations. See, eg., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S.
677 (1900); The Santissima Trinidad, 20 U.S. (7 Wheat) 283 (1822); Talbot v. Janson, 3 U.S. (3
Dall) 133 (1755); see also J. Kent, COMMENTARIES ON AMERICAN LAW 186 (1987)("the law
of nations, and the municipal laws of every country, authorize the owner to reclaim his prop-
erty taken by pirates, wherever it is found"). In all of these cases, plaintiffs had a right to a
remedy directly under the law of nations; none of the courts required that a "private right of
action" be inferred from a criminal "law of nations" statute. Indeed, it was in this context that
the Supreme Court in the Paquete Habana made the now-famous assertion that
International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the
courts of appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination. For this prupose, where there is no treaty,
and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had
to the customs and usages of civilized nations; and as evidence of these, to the works of
jurists and commentators ....
175 U.S. at 700 (emphasis added). See, Casto, supra note 24, at 480; see also Letter from Sec. of
State T. Jefferson to French Minister, supra this note, at 364 (Ford ed. 1904).
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tion,"90 the Department cites the federal question provision, 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, and Handel v. Artukovic.91 In Handel, however, the court took
pains to distinguish between section 1350's requirement that a plaintiff
show only a "violation" of the law of nations, and section 133 I's require-
ment that plaintiffs claim "arise under" the substantive law.92 Following
Judge Edwards' concurrence in Tel-Oren, the Handel court stated that
"the 'violation' language of section 1350 may be interpreted as explicitly
granting a cause of action" even if "the 'arising under' language of section
1331 cannot ...... ,9 As Judge Edwards explained in Tel-Oren:
Unlike section 1331, which requires that an action 'arise under' the
laws of the United States, section 1350 does not require that the action
'arise under' the law of nations, but only mandates a 'violation of the
law of nations' in order to create a cause of action. The language of
the statute is explicit on this issue: by its express terms, nothing more
than a violation of the law of nations is required to invoke section 1350.
... Congress, of course, knew full well that it could draft section 1350
with 'arising under' language, or the equivalent, to require a 'cause of
action' or 'right to sue,' but it chose not to do so. There simply is no
basis in the language of the statute, its legislative history or relevant
precedent to read section 1350 as though Congress had required that a
right to sue must be found in the law of nations.
94
Like its jurisdictional argument, the Justice Department's attempt
to superimpose a "cause of action" requirement upon section 1350 runs
afoul of a basic maxim of statutory construction: that a statute should
not be construed so as to render any part of it "superfluous, void, or
insignificant.""5 Where a cause of action can be inferred under some
other federal statute, jurisdiction would by definition lie under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331, for the claim would then "arise under" a federal law. Thus, if
the Justice Department is correct, section 1350 serves no purpose.
Although section 1350 was passed prior to section 1331, it was retained
long after the section 1331 "federal question" provision had become well-
established. The Justice Department offers no explanation why Congress
has bothered to retain and recodify a redundant jurisdictional statute.
The most sensible explanation, of course, is that section 1350 is not re-
90. J.D. Br. at 21.
91. Handel v. Artukovic, 601 F. Supp. 1421, 1426-27 (C.D. Cal. 1985).
92. Id at 1426-27.
93. Id. at 1427 (emphasis added).
94. Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 779 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (emphasis in
the original) (Edwards, J., concurring) cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985).
95. C. Sands, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 46.06 (4th ed.1973).
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dundant. It explicitly creates a cause of action for torts committed in
violation of the law of nations.
The Justice Department claims that separation of powers is "a com-
pelling factor counselling hesitation" against recognizing a cause of ac-
tion here.96 Invoking Judge Bork's isolated approach in Tel-Oren, the
Department urges this Court to impress a cause of action requirement
upon the Alien Tort Statute which would effectively nullify it. As one
judge has recognized, a court that adopted such an approach would ex-
ceed its judicial function, for such an approach would "rewrit[e] Con-
gress' words and renounc[e] the task that Congress has placed before"
the court." It would be ironic indeed if undifferentiated separation of
powers concerns led this Court to adopt an approach to the Alien Tort
Statute that effectively read it off the books.9"
B. Even if Section 1350 Is Not Viewed as Granting a Cause of
Action, Plaintiffs Have a Right of Action under
International Human Rights Law.
Even accepting arguendo the Justice Department's position that sec-
tion 1350 does not itself provide a cause of action, it does not follow that
plaintiffs lack an enforceable right of action. This Court may find that
plaintiffs can derive a cause of action from municipal tort law99 or di-
96. J.D. Br. at 25 n.21.
97. Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 791 (Edwards, ., concurring).
98. Individual judges concerned about separation of powers problems could address those
concerns in individual cases by applying existing doctrines of federal jurisdiction on a case-by-
case basis, rather than by adopting a reading of the Alien Tort Statute that would effectively
reduce it to a dead letter. See Koh, supra note 55, at 202-08 & n.113.
99. For example, some judges have suggested that § 1350 is a forum-shifting statute, and
that a plaintiff's cause of action thus derives from municipal tort law. See, eg., Tel-Oren, 726
F.2d at 782-88 (Edwards, 3., concurring); cert denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985); Adra v. Cliff, 195
F. Supp. 857 (D. Md. 1985). Under this view, which the Department's brief nowhere men-
tions, an alien plaintiff would derive his affirmative right to sue from the relevant state or
national tort law (as determined by applying traditional choice-of-law principles), which would
provide the substantive standard for liability, just as it would in an ordinary state transitory
tort action. See Randall, supra note 41, at 33-39. If plaintiff could further allege that the tort
were "committed in violation of the law of nations," that allegation would suffice to shift the
tort suit into federal court. There, it would be tried under the relevant municipal tort law, just
as an allegation that two parties are diverse and that the jurisdictional amount in controversy
exists would suffice under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to "shift" a state tort claim into federal court to be
tried under the relevant state tort law. While this "forum-shifting approach" would admit-
tedly represent a "minority view," Randall, supra note 41, at 36, it nonetheless claims more
adherents than the Justice Department's singular position. More important, this view, unlike
the Department's position, at least comports with the drafters' purpose of directing these cases
into federal tribunals.
The exercise of § 1350 jurisdiction would be constitutional under this approach even if the
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rectly from international law. Since Nuremberg, the customary inter-
national law of human rights has developed to the point where it
provides individuals with a right to invoke it directly in domestic courts.
As the United States itself established in its Memorandum in Filartiga, a
right of action can be located in international law itself for certain egre-
gious customary international law violations."
Arguing that the law of nations "does not give plaintiffs a private
right of action,"101 the Justice Department now effectively renounces the
position it maintained in Filartiga. Its argument, however, rests on a
profound misunderstanding of the relation between customary inter-
national law and U.S. law, one which attempts to resurrect a strictly
"statist" view of international law that neither the Framers nor contem-
porary international law scholars accept.
The Justice Department maintains that "the traditional role of the
'law of nations' is not the creation of private rights."102 But it is precisely
this "traditional" view of international law that the Government's 1980
Filartiga Memorandum pointed out had long been rejected.10 3 In Filar-
tiga, the United States explained that international law had evolved con-
siderably since the days when states were viewed as absolutely sovereign
with regard to treatment of their own citizens, and that international law
was deemed part of municipal law only when municipal law expressly
incorporated it."~ The United States' Filartiga Memorandum carefully
delineated the development of an international law of human rights, from
"[e]arly in this century" to 1980.105 The Memorandum demonstrated
the obsolescence of the view that international law is wholly inter-
national, and established that customary international law guarantees in-
dividuals "certain fundamental human rights," including the right to be
substantive law ultimately applied were not federal law. This is because the necessary substan-
tive threshold determination of whether the law of nations or a treaty of the United States has
been violated is a federal question. See Tel-Oren, 726 F.2d at 787 n.19 (Edwards, I., concur-
ring); cf. supra note 60 (citing Verlinden B.V. v. Central Bank Of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 493
(1983)(when a case "necessarily raises questions of substantive federal law at the very outset,"
it "clearly 'arises under' federal law, as that term is used in Article 1II")). See also Republic of
Philippines v. Marcos, 806 F.2d 344, 352-54 (2d Cir. 1986)(holding that claim against Marcos
for cause of action under state law may be heard in federal court, because "there is federal
question jurisdiction over actions having important foreign policy implications"), cert. dis.
missed sub noma., Ancor Holding, N.V. v. Republic of Philippines, 107 S. Ct. 1597 (1987).
100. See Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, 19 IL.M. at 601-06.
101. J.D. Br. at 24.
102. Idl at 27.
103. Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, 19 I.L.M. at 601-602.
104. Id
105. Id at 589-95.
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free from torture.0 6 This evolution, the United States explained, is also
reflected in the international law of remedies:
A corollary to the traditional view that the law of nations dealt pri-
marily with the relationship among nations rather than individuals was
the doctrine that generally only states, not individuals, could seek to
enforce rules of international law... Just as the traditional view no
longer reflects the state of customary international law, neither does
the latter doctrine.... The more recently evolved international law of
human rights similarly endows individuals with the right to invoke in-
ternational law, in a competent forum and under appropriate
circumstances.
10 7
This historical evolution portrayed by the United States' Government
Filartiga Memorandum has been widely accepted among scholars.' 08
Thus, modern international law recognizes that individuals may in-
voke domestic remedies for violations of certain fundamental norms of
international human rights law, such as torture. °9 The Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights, which is widely acknowledged as reflecting
binding norms of customary international law, 1" 0 guarantees the follow-
106. IdL at 589, 595-601.
107. Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, 19 LLM. at 602.
108. See TiRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, Part VII, Introductory Note; id, at § 907
comment a ("If a rule of customary international law has become a part of United States law, a
domestic remedy may be available for its enforcement"); Higgins, Conceptual ThinkingAbout
the Individual in International Law, 24 N.Y.L.S. L. REv. 11 (1978); Janis, Individuals As
Subjects of International Law, 17 CORNELL INT'L L. J. 61 (1984); Schneebaum, supra note 74;
Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather Than States,
32 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (1982).
109. This modem view of international law obligations, moreover, comports with the views
of the Framers, who considered the law of nations to apply universally through the common
law, creating rights and obligations for individuals as well as states. See, supra notes 86-95 and
accompanying text; Note, Enforcing the Customary International Law, supra note 46, at 198;
Dickinson, supra note 44, at 26-27, 792; 1 Op. Att'y. Gen. 68, 69 (1797)(Lee)("The common
law has adopted the law of nations in its fullest extent, and made it a part of the law of the
land"). See also The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 679, 700 (1900).
110. The Justice Department now dismisses this document as "merely aspirational" and
"precatory." J.D. Br. at 28 n.24. Yet in its Filartiga memorandum, the Department took
precisely the opposite position, Le., that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights reflects
customary international law binding on all states. See Government Filartiga Memorandum,
supra note 11, 19 LL.M. at 593. The Second Circuit acknowledged this view in reaching its
decision in Filartiga. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 530 F.2d 876, 883 (2d Cir. 1980)("several
commentators have concluded that the Universal Declaration has become, in toto, a part of
binding, customary international law"). Moreover, in the Hostages Case before the Intema-
tional Court of Justice, the United States invoked six articles from the Universal Declaration
as reflections of binding customary international law enforceable against Iran. United States
Memorial in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Teheran (United States v. Iran),
1980 LCJ. 3, cited in Lilich, Role of Domestic Courts in Enforcing International Human
Rights Law, PROC. AM. SOC. INT'L L. 20,23 (1980). Given that the United States' representa-
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ing procedural right:
Everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent na-
tional tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him
by the constitution or by law.
111
The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, also cited by
the United States before the World Court in the Hostages Case and by
the Filartiga court as evidence of customary international law,1 2 simi-
larly obligates states to provide individuals with ".an effective remedy"
for violations of human rights.
1 13
While nations have discretion regarding which "national tribunals"
will provide the effective remedy required, once an. individual seeks re-
dress from one tribunal the burden rests on the respondent to show that
another effective tribunal is more appropriate. Where, as here, there is
no effective remedy other than the domestic judicial remedy, customary
law requires that that judicial remedy be made available.
The practice of nations, like the United States, that recognize inter-
national law as part of domestic law further confirms the customary obli-
gation of the United States to provide effective judicial remedies for
violations of fundamental human rights. 114 Precedents from the nine-
teenth century prize cases '1 to the twentieth century expropriation
cases1 16 make clear that the direct enforceability of customary inter-
tions in the International Court of Justice and in Filartiga reflect the international consensus,
there can be no warrant for the Justice Department's sudden "demotion" of this document,
See R. Lillich & F. Newman, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS: PROBLEMS Ov LAW AND
POLIcY 66 (1979).
111. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 8.
112. Cf supra note 110.
113. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 2(3).
114. For example, in Borovsky v. Commissioner of Immigration, 90 Phil. Rpts. 107 (1951),
the Philippine Supreme Court ordered an excludable alien released from indefinite detention
on the ground that his detention violated customary international law, as reflected by the
Universal Declaration, including specifically Article 8. Similarly, the Constitutional Court of
Germany has declared that although "contemporary generally recognized principles of inter-
national law included only a few legal rules that directly create rights and duties of private
individuals by virtue of the international law itself," they do create such rights and duties In
"the sphere of the minimum standards for the protection of human rights." In the Matter of
Republic of the Philippines, 46 BVerfGE 342, 362 (2BvM 1/76 December 13, 1977),
115. One famous example is The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900).
116. Individuals have frequently prevailed in claims that a foreign government's confisca-
tion of a property or contractual right violated customary international law. In none of these
cases did a court find that a private cause of action did not exist. See First Nat'l City Bank v.
Banco Para El Comercio de Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983); Dunhill v. Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S.
682 (1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972); Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Chase Manhattan Bank, 658 F.2d 875 (2d Cir. 1981); Banco Nacional de
Cuba v. Farr, 243 F. Supp. 957 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), affid 383 F.2d 166 (2d Cir. 1967), cert.
[Voel, 12
Interpreting the Alien Tort Statute
national law by individuals in federal courts is well-accepted in United
States jurisprudence.117 Most recently in Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Ma-
son,118 the court held that a United States citizen could invoke customary
international human rights law in federal court directly under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 for acts of torture and prolonged arbitrary detention." 9
The Justice Department altogether ignores these modem develop-
ments in international law. Instead, the Department argues that "the
law of nations applies to matters within the jurisdiction of the United
States only insofar as it is accepted into the law of the United States." 1"
The Department further suggests that such "acceptance" must take the
form of a specific "Act of Congress that 'defines' [the] substantive princi-
ple[] of international law to be part of United States law." '121 Thus,
under this position, section 1350 actions would be limited to conduct that
Congress has specifically defined elsewhere as an offense against the law
of nations.
The narrowing construction of the Alien Tort Statute now urged by
the Justice Department would dramatically limit the statute's effective-
ness as a judicial remedy for violation of fundamental human rights, in
derogation of the United States international obligation to provide such
denied, 390 U.S. 956 (1968). The Executive has expressly urged that federal courts should
adjudicate "a claim or counterclaim [that] alleged that an act of state violated customary inter-
national law." Letter of Legal Adviser Monroe Leigh, reproduced in Dunhill, 425 U.S. at 709.
Similarly, Congress has authorized the adjudication of claims against foreign sovereigns in
circumstances where "rights and property [were] taken in violation of international law." 28
U.S.C. § 1605(a)(3). If the Justice Department's view were adopted, none of these claims
could be pressed unless the individuals could also point to a "private right of action" derived
from some substantive criminal statute defining offenses against the law of nations.
117. Indeed, as the Supreme Court recognized in Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 238
(1979), having a cause of action has traditionally meant nothing more than that a litigant has
"recognized legal rights" whose invasion fiurnishes a basis for his claim to judicial relief. See
D'Amato, supra note 46, at 95. As Professor Randall points out, "in cases involving the treat-
ment of aliens, the confiscation of private property, and human rights, domestic courts have
construed the law of nations to confer rights on private persons. Such rules... may be di-
rectly applied by domestic courts without implementing legislation." Randall, supra note 76,
at 490. Accord, Schachter, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN THEORY AND PRACTnCE 234-235 (Col-
lected Courses, vol. 178, Academy of International Law, 1982), Schneebaum, supra note 74.
See also Note, Enforcing the Customary International Law, supra note 46, at 161-70 (conclud-
ing that, international human rights law recognizes substantive individual rights and contem-
plates individual enforcement of those rights).
118. Martinez-Baca v. Suarez-Mason, No. C-87-2057-SC, Slip Op. (N.D. Cal. Jan. 12,
1988).
119. See also Forti v. Suarez-Mason, 672 F. Supp. 1531, 1543-44 (N.D. Cal. 1987).
120. J.D. Br. at 25.
121. Ia at 26.
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
remedies.' 22 Moreover, the Department unjustifiably assumes that only
Congress may "accept" a rule of customary international law as the law
of the United States, and that a court may incorporate the law of nations
into federal law only by "acting pursuant to legislative authorization."
12 3
Yet federal courts have historically issued common law rulings accepting
a rule of customary international law as law of the United States even
without legislative authorization. 124 In any event, even by the Justice
Department's own standard, 28 U.S.C. section 1350 would constitute
more than sufficient "legislative authorization" for a federal court to in-
corporate international human rights norms into the domestic law of tort
remedies. While Congress may of course by statute limit the extent in
which international law becomes domestically binding - for example, by
imposing a territorial limit upon a statute criminalizing attacks upon dip-
lomats - Congress has imposed no such limit in the Alien Tort Statute,
where it has chosen to implement the United States' international obliga-
tions by authorizing the federal courts to hear "any" civil action brought
by aliens for torts "committed in violation of the law of nations."
Customary law does not recognize a right of judicial enforcement
for all violations of the law of nations, or even for all rights set forth in
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Article 8 expressly limits
the right to an effective remedy to "fundamental" rights. The United
States, in its Filartiga memorandum, stressed this important limitation,
reflected in the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino:1
2 5
Indeed, it is likely that only a few rights have the degree of specificity
and universality to permit private enforcement and that the protection
of other asserted rights must be left to the political branches of
government. 1
26
But where, as here, individuals allege that they have suffered violations of
fundamental customary international law norms, such as torture or de-
grading treatment or punishment, genocide, summary execution, arbi-
trary detention, or disappearance, international law contemplates
122. But see, THIRD RESTATEMENT, supra note 65, § 114 ("where fairly possible, a United
States statute is to be construed so as not to conflict with international law..
123. J.D. B. at 25.
124. See, eg., The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (applying international law of prize with-
out express legislative authorization); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Para El Comerelo Exte-
rior De Cuba, 462 U.S. 611 (1983)(applying principles of equity common to international law
and federal common law to determine whether American courts should pierce the corporate
veil of separate juridical entity established by foreign government to perform governmental
functions).
125. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428, 430 n.34 (1964).
126. See Government Filartiga Memorandum, supra note 11, :19 I.L.M. at 604.
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domestic judicial enforcement.127
When it enacted section 1350, Congress charged the federal courts
with the responsibility to adjudicate such actions. In The Paquete Ha-
bana, the Supreme Court further directed that, "[i]ntemational law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts of
appropriate jurisdiction as often as questions of right depending upon it are
duly presented for their determination."12 This Court should not accept
the Justice Department's invitation to create a conflict in the circuits by
ignoring these unambiguous directives from both Congress and the
Supreme Court.
CONCLUSION
For all the above reasons, amici respectfully suggest that this Court
reverse the rulings of the courts below and hold, consistent with the Sec-
ond Circuit in Filartiga, that the district courts have jurisdiction over
these consolidated cases under 28 U.S.C. section 1350 and that plaintiffs
have a right of action to seek redress for torts committed in violation of
customary international law. 29
127. When such violations of fundamental human rights are alleged, international comity
concerns would not bar adjudication of the suit. Under modem customary international law,
it is widely accepted that fundamental international human rights are a matter of international
concern and obligation, and that nations are obligated to abide by them even with respect to
treatment of their own citizens within their borders. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876,
884-885 (2d Cir. 1980). As the State Department noted in 1972:
Reflective of the recent growth of international human rights law is general
agreement within the international legal community that transgression of human
rights are not matters within a state's exclusive domestic jurisdiction and accord-
ingly, that the principle of nonintervention in internal affairs does not bar one state
from taling action designed to promote respect for human rights in another.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE, MEMORANDUM OF LAW: UNITED STATES Gov-
ERNMENTAL OBLIGATIONS REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUALS OUTSIDE THE
UNITED STATES (Aug. 23, 1972), reprinted in International Protection of Human Rights: The
Work of International Organizations and the Role of U.S Foreign Policy, Hearing before the
Subcomm. on International Organizations and Movements of the House Comm. on Foreign
Affairs, 93rd Cong., 1st Sess. 68 (1973).
128. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)(emphasis added).
129. Submitted by: David Cole, Jules Lobel, & Harold Hongju Koh.
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APPENDIX
UNITED STATES: MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED
STATES SUBMITTED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
SECOND CIRCUIT IN
FILARTIGA v. PENA-IRALA
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
No. 79-6090





APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
MEMORANDUM FOR THE UNITED STATES
AS AMICUS CURIAE
INTRODUCTION
The United States files this memorandum in response to the Court's
request that "the Department of State submit a memorandum setting
forth its position concering the proper interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1350
in light of the facts of this case."' 3" The memorandum addresses the
following questions:
1. Whether the torture of a foreign citizen by an official of the
130. Letter from A. Daniel Fusaro, Clerk, to Roberts B. Owen, October 29, 1979. Under
28 U.S.C. § 516, the conduct of litigation in which the United States or an agency is interested
is reserved to the Department of Justice. For that reason, the Department of Justice is filing
this memorandum, developed jointly by the Department of Justice and the Department of
State.
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same country is a violation of the law of nations within the meaning of
28 U.S.C. § 1350?
2. If so, whether such a violation gives rise to a judicially enforcea-
ble remedy and is therefore a tort within the meaning of that provision?
STATEMENT
This appeal involves the interpretation of 28 U.S.C. § 1350, which
gives the district courts jurisdiction in all cases where an alien sues for "a
tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the
United States." The complaint alleges that defendant, acting under color
of his authority as a Paraguayan official, tortured and killed Joel Filar-
tiga, a Paraguayan national, and that his conduct was a tort in violation
of the law of nations. The district court nonetheless held that it lacked
jurisdiction. The court acknowledged the strength of plaintiff's argument
that torture violates international law, but concluded that dismissal was
compelled by two prior decisions of this Court, I1T v. Vencap, Ltd., 1 '
and Dreyfus v. Von Finck,132 which it read to establish that:
conduct, though tortious, is not in violation of 'the Law of Nations', as
those words are used in 28 U.S.C. § 1350, unless the conduct is in
violation of those standards, rules or customs affecting the relationship
between states and between an individual and a foreign state, and used
by those states for their common good and/or in dealings inter se.
133
Because the court dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdiction, it did
not reach defendant's alternative argument for dismissal based on forum
non conveniens. Plaintiffs appealed to this Court.
ARGUMENT
I. OFFICIAL TORTURE VIOLATES THE
LAW OF NATIONS.
The district court dismissed the complaint because it believed that
the torture of a foreign citizen by an official of the same country does not
violate the law of nations as that term is used in 28 U.S.C. § 1350. If
section 1350 reached only those practices that historically have been
viewed as violations of international law, the court's decision would very
likely be correct. Before the turn of the century and even after, it was
131. T v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001 (2d Cir. 1975).
132. Dreyfus v. Von Fmck, 534 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835 (1976).
133. The quote of the district court is from the joint appendix to the United States' Filar-
riga memorandum. The joint appendix is not reprinted here.
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generally thought that a nation's treatment of its own citizens was be-
yond the purview of international law. But as we demonstrate below,
section 1350 encompasses international law as it has evolved over time.
And whatever may have been true before the turn of the century, today a
nation has an obligation under international law to respect the right of its
citizens to be free of official torture.
A. Section 1350 Encompasses the Law of Nations as that Body of
Law May Evolve.
Section 1350 originated as Section 9 of the Judiciary Act of 1789134
and has not changed significantly since that time. It provides that: "The
district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action by an
alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the law of nations or a
treaty of the United States." This is one of several provisions in the Judi-
ciary Act "reflecting a concern for uniformity in this country's dealings
with foreign nations and indicating a desire to give matters of interna-
tional significance to the jurisdiction of federal institutions."' 13"
The law of nations in section 1350 refers to the law of nations as that
body of law may evolve. There is no reason to believe that Congress
intended to freeze the meaning of the law of nations in this statute as of
1789, any more than it intended the simultaneous grant of jurisdiction
over maritime actions to be limited to maritime law as it then existed. 136
Since the law of nations had developed in large measure by reference to
evolving customary practice, the framers of the first Judiciary Act surely
anticipated that international law would not be static after 1789.
The Paquete Habana137 illustrates this evolutionary process. There,
the question was whether international law protected fishing ships from
capture during times of war. Although a 1798 British case had held that
the protection of such ships was a rule of comity only, the Court held
that "the period of a hundred years which has since elapsed is amply
sufficient to have enabled what originally may have rested in custom or
comity, courtesy or concession, to grow, by the general assent of civilized
nations, into a settled rule of international law."' 138
If the application of section 1350 were limited to the subjects en-
134. 1 STAT. 76 (1789).
135. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 427 n.25 (1964).
136. Maritime law has evolved significantly since 1789. See Moragne v. State Marine Lines,
398 U.S. 375 (1970) (overruling an 1886 decision and holding that maritime law affords a
remedy for wrongful death on navigable waters).
137. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
138. Id. at 694.
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compassed by the law of nations in 1789, leaving only the state courts
competent to administer any rules of international law that might subse-
quently develop, the result would be to frustrate the statute's central con-
cern for uniformity in this country's dealings with foreign nations.
Accordingly, the district court's jurisdiction in this case turns not on
whether the conduct alleged in the complaint would have been a viola-
tion of the law of nations in 1789, but on whether it is customarily
treated as a violation of the law of nations today.
B. International Law Now Embraces the Obligation of a State to
Respect the Fundamental Human Rights of Its Citizens.
The view that a state's treatment of its own citizens is beyond the
purview of international law was once widely held and is reflected in
traditional works on the subject. 139 However, as we have stated, custom-
ary international law evolves with the changing customs and standards of
behavior in the international community. Early in this century, as a con-
sequence of those changing customs, an international law of human
rights began to develop. This evolutionary process has produced wide
recognition that certain fundamental human rights are now guaranteed
to individuals as a matter of customary international law.
As we demonstrate in Part II, infra, this does not mean that all such
rights may be judicially enforced. Indeed, it is likely that only a few
rights have the degree of specificity and universality to permit private
enforcement and that the protection of other asserted rights must be left
to the political branches of government. But this distinction between ju-
dicially enforceable rights and rights enforceable only by the political
branches should not obscure the central point we make here. The dis-
trict court's assumption that a nation has no obligation under interna-
tional law to respect the human rights of its citizens is fundamentally
incorrect.
The sources of international law are international agreements, inter-
national custom, general principals of law recognized by civilized na-
tions, and judicial decisions and the teachings of learned
commentators."4 Developments in each of these areas have had a role in
establishing the twentieth century international law of human rights.
The first significant treaty development was the Covenant of the
139. Eg., L. Oppenheim, INTERNATIONAL LAW: A TREATSF, VoL 1, 362-369 (2d Ed.
1912).
140. Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38, June 26, 1945, 59 Stat. 1055,
1060 (effective October 24, 1945). See also, The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. at 700.
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League of Nations in 1919, which declared that the members of the
League would attempt to secure and maintain fair and humane condi-
tions of labor, and secure just treatment for the inhabitants of territory
under their control.141 Other early developments were the treaties en-
tered into after World War I guaranteeing the religious, cultural, and
political rights of national minorities.
1 42
Treaty activity accelerated after World War II. In 1945, the United
Nations Charter imposed on U.N. members a general obligation to pro-
mote "universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and funda-
mental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or
religion." 43 The U.N. Charter represents a clear break with the tradi-
tional view that a nation's treatment of its citizens is beyond the concern
of international law-a break also evidenced by recognition in the Char-
ter of the Organization of American States of "the fundamental rights of
the individual without distinction as to race, nationality, creed, or
sex.
, 144
More recently, the obligation of states to respect fundamental
human rights has been reiterated in a growing number of more specific
multilateral treaties. These include The International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights,1 45 The American Convention on Human Rights
146
and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and
141. The Covenant of the League of Nations, Articles 22, 23, June 28, 1919, reprinted In
Treaties and Other International Agreements of the United States of America 1776.1949, 2
BEVANS 48, 55-57 (1969).
142. See eg., Treaty Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and Poland,,
signed at Versailles, June 28, 1919, reprinted in Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Proto.
col and Agreements Between the United States ofAmerica and Other Powers 1910-1923, 3 MAL-
LoY-REDMOND 3714 (1923). In addition, the general treaties of peace concluding the war
included provisions aimed at guaranteeing minority rights. See, e.g., Treaty of Peace with
Austria, Part 3, Sec. 5, signed at St. Germaine.en-Laye, September 10, 1919, reprinted In 3
MALLOY-REDMOND 3149.
143. UNITED NATIONS CHARTER, arts. 55, 56, 59 (June 26, 1945), Stat. 1031, 1045-1046, 3
BEVANS 1153, 1166-1167 (1969).
144. CHARTER OF THE ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, arts. 30), 16, 43(a) (en.
tered into force December 13, 1951), as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires of 1967
(entered into force February 27, 1970), OAS Treaty Series No. 1-C, OAS, OR, OEA/Ser.A/2
(English), Rev. (1970), 21 U.S.T. 607, T.I.A.S. 6847. See also American Declaration of the
Rights and Duties of Man, ch. 1 (1948), OAS, OR, OEA/Ser. L/V/E.23, Doc. 21, Rev. 2.
145. General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI)A (December 16, 1966), entered Into force
March 23, 1976; Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, Message from the President of the
United States, S. Doc. No. EXEC. C, D, E, and F, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. (1978).
146. Signed, San Jose, Costa Rica, November 22, 1969, entered into force July 18, 1978,
OAS Treaty Series No. 36, OAS, OR, OEA/Ser.A/16 (English).
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Fundamental Freedoms. 47
International custom also indicates that nations have accepted as
law an obligation to observe fundamental human rights. In 1948, The
United Nations General Assembly unanimously adopted the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, 48 which goes beyond the U.N. Charter in
specifying and defining the fundamental rights to which all individuals
are entitled. The Universal Declaration has been followed by a growing
number of U.N. resolutions clarifying and elaborating on these rights or
invoking them in specific cases. 149 In a parallel development, the Inter-
national Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, which met
in Helsinki and Geneva between 1973 and 1975, adopted a Final Act
declaring that the participating nations would respect the human rights
of their nationals.' 50 The Final Act, like the U.N. resolutions, does not
have the legal effect of a treaty but provides evidence of customary inter-
national law.' 5 '
General principles of law recognized by civilized nations also estab-
lish that there are certain fundamental human rights to which all individ-
uals are entitled, regardless of nationality. Although specific practices
differ widely among nations, all nations with organized legal systems rec-
ognize constraints on the power of the state to invade their citizens'
human rights. In the period 1948-1973, the constitutions or other impor-
tant laws of over 75 states either expressly referred to or clearly bor-
rowed from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.'52 In the same
period, the Declaration was referred to in at least 16 cases in domestic
courts of various nations.'
53
The decisions of the International Court of Justice also reflect and
confirm the existence of a customary international law of human
147. Signed November 4, 1950, entered into force September 3, 1953, Council of Europe,
European Treaty Series No. 5 (1968), 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
148. General Assembly Resolution 217 (Ifl)A (December 10, 1948).
149. See United Nations Action in the Field of Human Rights (1974), ST/HR/2 (Pub.
Sales No. E.74.XIV.2), at 14-15.
150. Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe: Final Act (Helsinki, 1975), 73
DEP'T STATE BuL-L 323, 325 (1975).
151. As further evidence, see Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Cooperation amond States in accordance with the Charter of the
United Nations, General Assembly Resolution 2625 (XXV) (October 24, 1970). The Declara-
tion proclaims that: "Every State has the duty to promote through joint and seperate action
universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms in accordance
with the Charter." It further states: "The principles of the Charter which are embodied in this
Declaration constitute basic principles of international law .....
152. UNITED NATIONS ACrION, supra note 149, at 17-18.
153. Id. at 19.
1988]
Hastings Int'l and Comparative Law Review
rights.1 54 And the affidavits of four American experts in international
law, filed by plaintiffs below, document the broad recognition among
legal scholars that human rights obligations are now part of customary
international law. 5'
In sum, as the Department of State said in a recent report to Con-
gress on human rights practices: "There now exists an international con-
sensus that recognizes basic human rights and obligations owed by all
governments to their citizens.... There is no doubt that these rights are
often violated; but virtually all governments acknowledge their
validity. 1
56
We recognize that a panel of this Court has said that "violations of
international law do not occur when the aggrieved parties are nationals
of the acting state." As we have shown, however, this statement is incor-
rect and should not be followed. 157
C. Freedom from Torture Is among the Fundamental Human Rights
Protected by International Law.
Every multilateral treaty dealing generally with civil and political
human rights proscribes torture. These include The American Conven-
tion on Human Rights, 5 8 The International Covenant on Civil and
154. Nuclear Tests (Australia v. France), Judgment of December 20, 1974, 1974 IC.J. 253,
303 (Opinion of Judge Petren); Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the
Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Secur-
ity Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971 I.C.J. 16.
155. See Affidavit of Richard B. Lilich (A. 65-70); Affidavit orThomas M. Franck (A. 63-
64); Affidavit of Myres S. MacDougal (A. 71); Affidavit of Richard Anderson Falk (A. 61-62),
156. DEPARTMENT OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR
1979, published as Joint Committee Print, House Comm. on Foreign Affairs & Senate Comm.
on Foreign Relations, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (February 4, 1980) Introduction at 1.
157. Dreyfus v. Von Frink, 534 F. 2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 835
(1976) mistakenly relied on Mr. Justice White's dissent in Sabbatino for its conclusion. At one
point in his opinion Mr. Justice White does distinguish several cases decided long before the
turn of the century as cases where violations of international law were not present because the
parties were nationals of the acting state. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398,
442 n.2 (1964). However, Mr. Justice White makes clear elsewhere in his opinion that this is
not the law today. In discussing a case in which an individual brought suit to recover property
expropriated by the Nazis, Mr. Justice White specifically explained that "racial and religious
expropriations, while involving nationals of the foreign state and therefore customarily not
cognizable under international law, had been condemned in multinational agreements and dec-
larations as crimes against humanity." Id. at 457 n.18. Accordingly, Mr. Justice White con-
cluded, "the acts ould ... be measured in local courts against widely held principle rather than
judged by the parochial views of the forum." Id. Mr. Justice White's opinion thus reinforces
our view that international law prohibits a nation from violating the fundamental human
rights of its citizens.
158. Article 5 provides in relevant part, that "No one shall be subjected to torture or to
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Political Rights"5 9 and The European Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms."'C In addition, the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 forbid torture in international or domestic conflicts
and declare it to be a "grave breach" of the conventions. 16' This uniform
treaty condemnation of torture provides a strong indication that the pro-
scription of torture has entered into customary international law. 162
We do not suggest that every provision of these treaties states a
binding rule of customary international law. Where reservations have
been attached by a significant number of nations to specific provisions or
where disagreement with provisions is cited as the ground for a nation's
refusal to become a party, the near-unanimity required for the adoption
of a rule into customary international law may be lacking. 63 No such
disagreement has been expressed about the provisions forbidding torture.
A court also must distinguish between provisions that reflect princi-
ples that are considered desirable but incapable of immediate realization
and those provisions that codify fundamental human rights. Illustrative
of the former category are the declarations in the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights that individuals are entitled to
cruel, inhuman, or degrading punishment or treatment." OAS Treaty Series No. 36, supra
note 146, at 2.
159. Article 7: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading
treatment or punishment." General Assembly Resolution 2200 (XXI)A, supra note 145.
160. Article 3: "No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment
or punishment." Council of Europe, European Treaty Series No. 5 (1968), 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
161. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, T.I.A.S. No. 3364, Articles 3, 13, 129, 130.
162. These treaty provisions, in conjunction with other evidence, are persuasive of the
existence of an international norm that is binding as a matter of customary law on all nations,
not merely those that are parties to the treaties. A. D'Amato, THE CONCEPT OF CUSTOM IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 103, 124-128 (1971).
The United States has signed both the American Convention on Human Rights and the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and those instruments await the advice
and consent of the Senate. See Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, supra note 145.
Only European countries are entitled to be parties to the third treaty.
163. For instance, Article 20 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
prohibits "advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to dis-
crimination, hostility or violence... ." Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, supra note
145, at 29. This provision conflicts with principles of free speech that are central to the polit-
ical values of many democracies. A number of nations, including the United Kingdom, Swe-
den, Denmark, Norway, and Finland, expressed reservations to Article 20 upon ratifying the
Covenant. Multilateral Treaties in Respect of Which the Secretary General Performs Depositary
Functions, UN Doc. ST/LEG/Ser. D/12 108, 112, 114 (1978). President Carter has proposed
a similar reservation in connection with United States ratification. Four Treaties Pertaining to
Human Rights, supra note 145, at XI-XII.
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favorable working conditions and to social security. 164 In proposing that
the Senate ratify that treaty, the President observed:
Some of the standards established under these articles may not readily
be translated into legally enforceable rights, while others are in accord
with United States policy, but have not yet been fully achieved. It is
accordingly important to make clear that these provisions are under-
stood to be goals whose realization will be sought rather than obliga-
tions requiring immediate implementation.
65
The President further recommended that the Senate express its under-
standing that these and like provisions "described goals to be achieved
progressively rather than through immediate implementation."1 66 The
Covenant itself casts these principles in this light.167 In contrast, because
torture is universally condemned and incompatible with accepted con-
cepts of human behavior, the protection against torture must be consid-
ered a fundamental human right.
International custom also evidences a universal condemnation of
torture. While some nations still practice torture, it appears that no state
asserts a right to torture its nationals. Rather, nations accused of torture
unanimously deny the accusation and make no attempt to justify its
use. 6 ' That conduct evidences an awareness that torture is universally
condemned. This universal condemnation is made explicit in The Uni-
versal Declaration of Human Rights, which declares that "No one shall
be subjected to torture .... ."16 9 That principle has been reiterated in a
number of unanimous U.N. resolutions, including the 1975 Declaration
on the Protection of All Persons from Being Subjected to Torture and
Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment ("U.N.
Declaration on Torture").
170
164. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Articles 7, 9, Four
Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, supra note 145, at 15-16.
165. Four Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, supra note 145, at X.
166. Id. at IX.
167. International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, Article 2(1), Four
Treaties Pertaining to Human Rights, supra note 145, at 14.
168. See, eg., Affidavit of Richard Anderson Falk (A. 62); Affidavit of Thomas M. Franck
(A.64). In exchanges between United States embassies and all foreign states with which the
United States maintains relations, it has been the Department of State's general experience that
no government has asserted a right to torture its own nationals. Where reports of such torture
elicit some credence, a state usually responds by denial or, less frequently, by asserting that the
conduct was unauthorized or constituted rough treatment short of torture. The Department's
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 156, reports no assertion by any nation
that torture is justified.
169. General Assembly Resolution 217(II1)A (December 10, 1948), Art. 5.
170. General Assembly Resolution 3452(XXX) (December 9, 1975). Article 2 of the Dec-
laration provides:
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The U.N. Declaration on Torture not only confirms that interna-
tional custom outlaws torture, but also supplies a precise definition of the
conduct proscribed. The U.N. Declaration on Torture defines torture
as-
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental,
is intentionally inflicted by or at the instigation of a public official on a
person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person in-
formation or a confession, punishing him for an act he has committed
or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating him or other per-
sons. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent
in or incidental to, lawful sanctions to the extent consistent with the
Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.
17 1
This definition provides guidance to any court that may be required to
determine whether particular conduct violates the proscription of torture
in customary international law.
Analysis of general principles of law also discloses consistent con-
demnation of torture in national constitutions and legislation. Torture is
specifically forbidden in the constitutions of over 40 nations.17 2 The con-
stitutions of over 15 additional nations contain implicit prohibitions
against torture.173 Eighteen states have incorportated the Universal Dec-
Any act of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment is
an offence to human dignity and shall be condemned as a denial of the purposes of
the Charter of the United Nations and as a violation of the human rights and funda-
mental freedoms proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
Article 3 provides:
No State may permit or tolerate torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment. Exceptional circumstances such as a state of war or a threat of
war, internal political instability or any other public emergency may not be invoked
as a justification of torture or other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment.
171. General Assembly Resolution 3452(XXX) (December 9, 1975), Annex, Art. 1 (1).
The United Nations Human Rights Commission is now drafting a Convention Against Tor-
ture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment. That draft Conven-
tion would require each party to make torture criminally punishable within its jurisdiction. It
contains a very similar definition of torture (E/CN.4/1367, Annex at 1):
For the purpose of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or
suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such
purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, pun-
ishing him for an act he or a third person has committed, or is suspected of having
committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based
on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the
instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person
acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from,
inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.
172. Revue Internationale de Droit Penal Nos. 3 and 4, at 208 (1977).
173. Id. at 208-209.
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laration of Human Rights in their constitutions and therefore have ac-
cepted the prohibition against torture contained in Article 5 of the
Declaration.
174
Condemnation of torture is reflected in both constitutional and stat-
utory law in the United States. Conduct falling w:ithin the definition of
torture in the U.N. Declaration on Torture would be a criminal offense
under 18 U.S.C. § 242 and civilly actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 or
under the United States Constitution. Moreover, with certain excep-
tions, federal statutes bar assistance "to any country the government of
which engages in a consistent pattern of gross violations of internation-
ally recognized human rights", specifically including "torture." 175 These
statutes evidence the United States' acceptance of the international norm
condemning torture and reflect the fact that the norm is certain enough
to be cognizable in federal courts.
Finally, judicial decisions and the commentary of experts confirm
that official torture violates international law. As shown in Part IB, these
authorities recognize the modern emergence of human rights norms in
customary international law. Plaintiffs have submitted the affidavits of
four American scholars confirming that the proscription of torture is
such a norm. 176 And published commentary is to the same effect. 177 In
these circumstances, the conclusion that international law prohibits tor-
ture is inescapable.
II. OFFICIAL TORTURE IS A TORT AND GIVES RISE
TO A JUDICIALLY ENFORCEABLE REMEDY.
Not every violation of international law is a tort within the meaning
of section 1350. However, some such violations are judicially cognizable
as torts. A corollary to the traditional view that the law of nations dealt
primarily with the relationship among nations rather than individuals
was the doctrine that generally only states, not individuals, could seek to
enforce rules of international law.1 7 8 Just as the traditional view no
longer reflects the state of customary international 'law, neither does the
latter doctrine.
Indeed, it has long been established that in certain situations, indi-
174. Id. at 211.
175. 22 U.S.C. § 2304(a)(2), (d); 22 U.S.C. § 2151.
176. Affidavit of Richard Anderson Falk (A. 61-62); Affidavit of Thomas M. Franck (A.
63-64); Affidavit of Richard B. Lillich (A. 65-70); Affidavit of Myres S. MacDougal (A. 71).
177. O'Boyle, Torture and Emergency Powers Under the Europtan Convention on Human
Rights: Ireland v. The United Kingdom, 71 AM J. INT'L L. 674, 687-688 (1977).
178. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 422-423 (1964).
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viduals may sue to enforce their rights under international law. For ex-
ample, when a ship is seized on the high seas in violation of international
law, the owner of the ship may sue to recover the ship as well as seek
damages.179 Similarly, when there has been an assault on a foreign am-
bassador in violation of international law, domestic courts may properly
furnish a remedy. 80
The more recently evolved international law of human rights simi-
larly endows individuals with the right to invoke international law, in a
competent forum and under appropriate circumstances. The highly
respected Constitutional Court of Germany has recognized this right of
individuals. The court declared that, although "contemporary generally
recognized principles of international law include only a few legal rules
that directly create rights and duties of private individuals by virtue of
international law itself," an area in which they do create such rights and
duties is "the sphere of the minimum standard for the protection of
human rights."' 181
As a result, in nations such as the United States where international
law is part of the law of the land, an individual's fundamental human
rights are in certain situations directly enforceable in domestic courts.
As the Supreme Court said in The Paquete Habana: "International law is
part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts
of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right de-
pending upon it are duly presented for their determination.18
Because foreign officials are among the prospective defendants in
suits alleging violations of fundamental human rights, such suits unques-
tionably implicate foreign policy considerations. But not every case or
controversy which touches foreign relations lies beyond judicial cogni-
zance.'1 3 Like many other areas affecting international relations, the
protection of fundamental human rights is not committed exclusively to
the political branches of government."'
179. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
180. Cf Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. (1 Dall.) 111 (1784).
181. In Matter of the Republic of the Philippines, 46 BVerfGE 342, 362 (2 BvM 1/76,
December 13, 1977) (translated from the German by Stefan A. Riesenfeld); see also Borovsky
v. Commissioner of Immigration, Judgment of September 28, 1951 (S.Ct. Philippines), sum-
marized in [1951] UNrrED NATONS YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGS 287-288; Chirskoir v.
Commissioner of Immigration, Judgment of October 26, 1951 (S.Ct. Philippines), summarized
in id at 288-289; Judgment of Court of First Instance of Courtrai (Belgium) of June 10, 1954,
summarized in [1954] UNITED NATIONS YEARBOOK ON HUMAN RIGHTS 21 (courts relied on
Universal Declaration of Human Rights in ordering release from detention).
182. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677,700 (1900).
183. Baker v. Car, 369 U.S. 186, 211 (1962).
184. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 423, 430 n. 34 (1964).
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This does not mean that section 1350 appoints the United States
courts as Commissions to evaluate the human rights performance of for-
eign nations.18 5 The courts are properly confined to determining whether
an individual has suffered a denial of rights guaranteed him as an individ-
ual by customary international law. Accordingly, before entertaining a
suit alleging a violation of human rights, a court must first conclude that
there is a consensus in the international community that the right is pro-
tected and that there is a widely shared understanding of the scope of this
protection. 186 When these conditions have been satisfied, there is little
danger that judicial enforcement will impair our foreign policy efforts.
To the contrary, a refusal to recognize a private cause of action in these
circumstances might seriously damage the credibility of our nation's
commitment to the protection of human rights. As we have shown in
Part IC, official torture is both clearly defined and universally con-
demned. Therefore, private enforcement is entirely appropriate.
18 7
From what we have said, it should be clear that a court is not at
liberty to enforce its own views of policy under the guise of interpreting
the requirements of international law. On the other hand, as the
Supreme Court stated in Sabbatino:
It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the more
appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions regarding it, since
the courts can then focus on the application of an agreed principle to
circumstances of fact rather than on the sensitive task of establishing a
principle not inconsistent with the national interest or with interna-
tional justice.1
8 8
In this case, not only is there a consensus in the international com-
munity that official torture is unlawful, but Paraguay's Constitution ex-
185. Cf. id. at 423.
186. Id. at 428, 430 n.34.
187. There are few decisions which base judgments against torturers directly on customary
international law. But this attests to the longstanding condemnation of torture under municl-
pal law and the more recent evolution of international human rights law. Courts have, none-
theless, invoked customary international law along with municipal and treaty law in cases
involving torture. Ireland v. United Kingdom, Judgment of January 18, 1978 (European Ct,
of Human Rights) summarized in [1978] Y.B. EUR. CONy. ON HUMAN RIGHTS 602 (Council
of Europe) (UN Declaration of Torture relied on in interpreting the European Convention on
Human Rights); Auditeur Militaire v. Krumkamp, Pasicrisie Beige, 1950.3.37 (February 8,
1950) (Belgian Conseil de guerre de Brabant), summarized in 46 AM.J. INT'L L. 162-163
(1952) (Article 5 of Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which prohibits torture and cruel
treatment, cited as authority that under customary international law the defendant accused of
war crimes was not free to use torture).
188. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398, 428 (1964).
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pressly prohibits official torture"' and Paraguayan law recognizes a tort
action as an appropriate remedy.1'9 The compatibility of international
law and Paraguayan law significantly reduces the likelihood that court
enforcement would cause undesirable international consequences and is
therefore an additional reason to permit private enforcement.
Because international law and Paraguayan law both prohibit tor-
ture, this Court need not decide whether considerations of comity or a
proper construction of section 1350 might require a different result if,
despite the nearly universal condemnation implicit in the existence of a
rule of customary international law, the jurisdiction with the most imme-
diate interest in the controversy did not prohibit torture. Similarly, this
case does not present any questions concerning whether international
law, Paraguayan law or federal common law will govern other aspects of
this lawsuit. The only question presented is whether official torture is a
"tort... committed in violation of the law of nations... ."191 Because
the district court erred in concluding that it is not, its judgment should
be reversed and the case remanded for further proceedings."9 2
CONCLUSION
The judgment of the district court should be reversed and the case
remanded for further proceedings.1 93
189. Paraguayan Constitution art. 45.
190. Joint Appendix to this Memorandum, at 51-53, 80.
191. Because the lower court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, it did not decide whether
the case should be dismissed on the ground offorum non conveniens. Although we agree with
plaintiffs that this question should be addressed by the district court first, we note that when
the parties and the conduct alleged in the complaint have as little contact with the United
States as they have here, abstention in generally appropriate. Romero v. International Termi-
nal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). Plaintiffs
assert that abstention is inappropriate because a tort suit in Paraguay would be a sham. For
reasons of comity among nations, however, such an assertion should not be accepted absent a
very clear and persuasive showing. In determining whether abstention is appropriate, the
court should also consider the fact that the defendant has been deported. Compare United
States v. Castillo, 615 F.2d 878, 882 (9th Cir. 1980).
192. Defendant erroneously suggests (Br. 4-16) that Section 1350 is unconstitutional in
conferring jurisdiction on federal courts to entertain tort actions under the law of nations.
Customary international law is federal law, to be enunciated authoritatively by the federal
courts. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 425; see The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900). An
action for tort under international law is therefore a case "arising under.., the laws of the
United States" within Article III of the Constitution. See Note, Federal Common Law and
Article Il" A Jurisdictional Approach to Erie, 74 YALE LJ. 325, 331-336 (1964).
193. Submitted by: Drew S. Days, III, Assistant Attorney General; John E. Huerta, Dep-
uty Assistant Attorney General; Brian K. Landsberg & Irving Gornstein, Attorneys, Depart-
ment of Justice; Roberts B. Owen, Legal Advisor;, William T. Lake, Deputy Legal Advisor;,
Stefan A. Riesenfeld, Charles Runyon, & Linda A. Baumann, Attorneys, Department of State.
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